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RACIAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN POLICE KILLING 
CASES 
  JASMINE B. GONZALES ROSE∗ 
 The United States is facing a twofold crisis: police killings of people 
of color and unaccountability for these killings in the criminal justice 
system. In many instances, the officers’ use of deadly force is captured on 
video and often appears clearly unjustified, but grand and petit juries still 
fail to indict and convict, leaving many baffled. This Article provides an 
explanation for these failures: juror reliance on “racial character evidence.” 
Too often, jurors consider race as evidence in criminal trials, particularly in 
police killing cases where the victim was a person of color. Instead of 
focusing on admissible evidence, jurors rely on race to determine the 
defendant’s innocence, the victim’s propensity for violence, and the 
witnesses’ credibility. This Article delineates the ways in which juror racial 
bias is utilized to take on evidentiary value at trial and constructs evidence 
law solutions to increase racial equality in the courtroom. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“I think he did it because he’s Mexican” and the alibi witness was 
not credible because he’s “an illegal.”1 
 
Too often jurors consider race as evidence of a person’s character 
in criminal trials. Instead of focusing on admissible evidence, jurors 
impermissibly rely on “racial character evidence”2 to determine 
 
 1. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017). This case offers 
an example of a juror’s reliance on racial character evidence against a defendant and his 
alibi witness to discriminatorily convict the defendant. Although less recognized, racial 
character evidence against a victim can similarly be relied upon to discriminatorily 
acquit a defendant, which is the subject of this Article.  
 2. This term was coined in Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward a Critical 
Race Theory of Evidence, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2243, 2262–63 (2017) and refers to an 
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whether a defendant is guilty or innocent, whether a victim is 
aggressive or peaceful, or whether a witness is credible or not credible. 
The term “racial character evidence” refers to the way a person’s race 
is used as de facto proof of his or her character. More specifically, it 
describes how race—in tandem with racial stereotypes and biases—is 
relied upon or emphasized to establish the person’s character propensity 
to be peaceful, violent, truthful, deceptive, or a variety of other traits. 
Fact-finders then rely upon this racial character evidence to determine 
how a party, witness, or victim acted during a given event, such as 
during an interaction between a police officer and community member. 
Character evidence to prove one’s propensity to engage in certain 
behavior is generally prohibited,3 and racial character evidence is never 
appropriate. Yet, the use of racial character evidence generally falls 
beneath the radar of judges. 
Juror reliance on racial character evidence has been difficult to 
uncover since, in most jurisdictions, evidence rules barred jurors from 
testifying about racial bias in deliberations or grand jury proceedings 
during an inquiry into the validity of the verdict or indictment.4 
 
instance in which admitted evidence introduced ostensibly for non-character purposes 
aligns with or promotes reliance on racial stereotypes or bias (whether negative or 
positive) and has the effect of character evidence by suggesting something is more 
likely to have occurred based on the race of the subject. See also Montré D. Carodine, 
Contemporary Issues in Critical Race Theory: The Implications of Race as Character 
Evidence in Recent High–Profile Cases, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 679, 687 (2014) 
(“[W]hen what we think of in a more traditional sense as evidence confirms any 
negative racial stereotypes (like blacks being dishonest or criminally inclined), it 
exacerbates the preexisting problem of race as character evidence.”); Chris Chambers 
Goodman, The Color of Our Character: Confronting the Racial Character of Rule 
404(b) Evidence, 25 L. & INEQ. 1, 3 (2007). 
The term [racial character evidence] is partly accurate and partly a 
misnomer. Racial character evidence is evidence in the sense that juries 
often rely upon it in reaching a verdict. However, it is not technically 
evidence because it is usually not formally introduced or subjected to 
evidentiary scrutiny. In other words, it is not admissible legal proof.  
Gonzales Rose, supra, at 2262. 
 3. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (“Evidence of a person’s character or 
character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted 
in accordance with the character or trait.”). However, limited exceptions exist for 
criminal defendants to introduce opinion or reputation evidence of their or a victim’s 
character. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2). Or it may be introduced in rare instances when 
character evidence is an essential element of a claim or defense. FED. R. EVID. 405. 
 4. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 606(b). The rule states:  
During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may 
not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the 
jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s 
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Recently, in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado,5 the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that such no-impeachment rules must yield to the 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to an impartial jury when a 
juror clearly relies upon racial bias in rendering a guilty verdict.6 
The Peña-Rodriguez ruling was a positive step forward in tackling 
jurors’ overt reliance on racial character evidence, and many might 
assume that the problem of such juror racial bias has been put to rest. 
This opinion, however, does not address one of the most concerning 
racial and criminal justice issues of our times: police killings of people 
of color. Peña-Rodriguez invokes the Sixth Amendment’s impartiality 
clause and thus directly addresses only racial bias used to convict a 
criminal defendant, but not racial bias against a victim of color to 
acquit a defendant.7 Accordingly, further evidence law solutions are 
needed to address the problem of racial character evidence in police 
deadly force and other criminal cases where racial bias against a victim 
might result in a discriminatory acquittal. This is not to imply that 
evidence solutions are a panacea for racialized killings by police, but it 
is one overlooked avenue that should be employed along with policing 
reforms and other racial and criminal justice efforts, which are beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
Police killing cases are often racially-charged. In the majority of 
prosecutions of law enforcement officers for killing people while on-
duty,8 the victims are black and the police officers are white or 
otherwise not black.9 Police are rarely criminally prosecuted for killing 
 
vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. 
The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s 
statement on these matters.  
Id.   
 5. 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). The author notes that the Supreme Court Reporter 
used the incorrect spelling of Peña, spelling it “Pena,” in the case name. The 
replacement of the letter “ñ” with the entirely different letter “n” not only changes the 
party’s name and its pronunciation, but it also contributes to structural erasure of Latinx 
identity and existence. Thus, the author has consciously opted to use a more accurate 
spelling of Mr. Peña-Rodriguez’s name. See generally English-Language Media: What 
is Wrong with the Letter Ñ?, AL DÍA (Aug. 20, 2015), [https://perma.cc/8NMK-US92].  
 6. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.  
 7. Id. at 867–69.  
 8. This distinction of “on-duty” is made because of the numerous cases of 
domestic violence committed by off-duty police officers that have resulted in the deaths 
of white women. The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, GUARDIAN, 
[https://perma.cc/TRB4-YB7T] [hereinafter The Counted]. See generally DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE BY POLICE OFFICERS (Donald C. Sheehan ed. 2000). 
 9. Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2015), 
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people, but when such cases do go to trial, the evidence against the 
officer is usually exceptionally strong. Often, the victim was unarmed, 
shot in the back, while hands were raised or while fleeing, and with the 
incident caught on video.10 In deadly force cases, the primary question 
of fact is whether the officer reasonably feared for his or her safety or 
the safety of others.11 In the absence of proof, other than the officers’ 
own testimonies of such fear, the victims’ blackness (or brownness) too 
frequently stands in as “evidence” that the officers’ fear was objectively 
reasonable.12 
Jurors rely upon racial stereotypes about blacks and other people 
of color being violent, aggressive, and criminally-inclined, as well as 
dishonest and otherwise lacking credibility to conclude that the officers’ 
fear of a victim of color was reasonable and that witnesses of color 
should not be believed.13 Particularly pernicious is reliance on the black 
“brute” or “thug” stereotype, which casts black youth as “super-
predators” and black people of all ages as bigger, stronger, and more 
aggressive and threatening than people of other races to serve as 
“proof” that an officer’s use of deadly force was called for, despite 
legitimate evidence to the contrary. Before a grand jury and at trial, 
attorneys—including prosecutors who only begrudgingly pursue 
criminal charges or convictions—may try to emphasize these racial 
stereotypes. 
In prosecutions of police for killing people of color, jurors’ 
consideration of racial character evidence works in favor of the 
criminal defendant and thus does not directly violate the Sixth 
Amendment’s impartiality clause. The Sixth Amendment guarantees 
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury[.]”14 Thus, while the 
 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-few-
prosecuted/?utm_term=.23bdb0c89b8c (“Among the officers charged since 2005 for 
fatal shootings, more than three-quarters were white. Two-thirds of their victims were 
minorities, all but two of them black.”). 
 10. Id.  
 11. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (“[T]here can be no question 
that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 12. Mikah K. Thompson, Blackness as Character Evidence, 29 MICH. J. RACE 
& L. 321, 335–40 (2015); see generally Carodine, supra note 2; Blanche Bong 
Cook, Biased and Broken Bodies of Proof: White Heteropatriarchy, the Grand Jury 
Process, and Performance on Unarmed Black Flesh, 85 UMKC L. REV. 567, 573 
(2017). 
 13. See generally Carodine, supra note 2; Goodman, supra note 2.  
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
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Sixth Amendment serves to protect defendants against juror racial bias, 
it does not protect victims against juror racial bias. Accordingly, the 
Peña-Rodriguez decision, which relied on the Sixth Amendment for 
establishing a racial bias exception to no-impeachment rules, will not 
usually apply directly to cases of police killing people of color. 
Additionally, while juror racial discrimination against victims of color 
may violate constitutional equal protection guarantees,15 juror immunity 
and the double jeopardy clause foreclose post-acquittal remedies. This 
makes it all the more important that pre-verdict evidence law responses 
are developed and employed. This Article seeks to construct such pre-
acquittal evidence law solutions. 
As police killings are more frequently video-recorded and shared 
on social and broadcast media, and as public awareness about the 
problem increases, two topics are at the forefront of public and 
scholarly dialogue: race and evidence. However, these subjects are 
usually discussed separately. This Article serves as an attempt to 
connect the two and encourage a critical race evidentiary inquiry into 
police killing cases. Such an inquiry asks: How do race and racism play 
evidentiary roles in criminal prosecutions of law enforcement officers 
who have used deadly force against people of color? And: How can 
reforms of evidence law and practice increase racial equality? 
Put simply, a critical race evidentiary inquiry is important because 
evidence law is important. The facts submitted to a jury at trial are not 
determined by any independent investigation into the truth, but rather 
by how the rules and doctrines of evidence are employed to admit and 
exclude evidence.16 Evidence law is used to shape the available legal 
proof and, ultimately, the narrative or story that is considered by the 
fact-finder to determine guilt or innocence:17 to determine whether a 
state actor’s taking of a life was warranted or unjustified. 
The manner that racial subordination is advanced through evidence 
law has been largely overlooked. Racial subordination in the criminal 
justice system goes far deeper than overt racial animus or bias. Racial 
 
 15. See Tania Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 75, 79–80 (2009) [hereinafter Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal] (“A jury may not 
constitutionally acquit based on discrimination against the victims of the crime any 
more than that jury could constitutionally convict a defendant based on discrimination. 
It is one of the most basic tenets of equal protection law that state actors may not 
discriminate based upon race or gender, particularly within criminal trials.”); see also 
Tania Tetlow, Granting Prosecutors Constitutional Rights to Combat Discrimination, 
14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1117, 1121 (2012) [hereinafter Tetlow, Granting Prosecutors 
Rights].  
 16. Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2243. 
 17. Id. 
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subordination permeates many aspects of our legal system in 
inconspicuous ways. Most judges, lawyers, and scholars appear to 
assume that since evidence law is facially race-neutral, it applies 
equally to all persons irrespective of race and is immune from racially 
disparate application and impact.18 However, as this Article 
demonstrates through the example of the role of racial character 
evidence in police deadly force cases, evidence rules—and perhaps, 
even more importantly, the principles and values behind these rules—
are not applied or enforced equally along racial lines. Consequently, 
white parties and institutions collectively gain an unfair evidentiary 
advantage while people of color are disadvantaged by the role of racial 
character evidence. To increase racial equality, we must root out all of 
the ways that racial subordination is perpetuated through the law. A 
critical race evidentiary inquiry and resultant evidentiary solutions 
should be one of the many approaches developed to address structural 
racism in the criminal justice system. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the national 
crisis of unaccountability for racialized police killings. It looks at the 
failures at every stage in our criminal justice system to pursue charges, 
indict, convict, and sentence law enforcement officers who unjustifiably 
kill people of color. Part II examines racial character evidence and 
explains its role in deadly force cases. It delineates three categories of 
racial character evidence: inherent reliance, stereotype emphasis, and 
expert or lay opinion. Part III demonstrates how juror reliance on racial 
character evidence, which results in discriminatory acquittals, violates 
the equal protection rights of victims of color. It further sets forth how 
the double jeopardy prohibition and juror immunity foreclose post-
acquittal remedies, thereby necessitating the construction and 
implementation of pre-verdict evidence solutions. 
Finally, Part IV sets forth these evidence law solutions, including 
education of the bar and bench on critical evidentiary inquiry methods 
to identify racial character evidence; proper objections to impermissible 
racial character evidence; rebuttal evidence to counter racial stereotypes 
and bolster victims and witnesses of color’s good character; and jury 
instructions concerning racial character evidence. Although these 
solutions directly apply to the trial stage of prosecutions and the vast 
majority of police killing cases never make it to trial, the 
implementation of these evidence solutions would shape the formal and 
 
 18. See Carodine, supra note 2, at 681 (“Interestingly, however, in traditional 
evidence law and criminal law scholarship as well as in critical race theory scholarship, 
race as an evidentiary concept is largely overlooked.”). 
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informal evidence potentially available in a case. This could, in turn, 
influence all aspects of a prosecution, including the decision to pursue 
charges and an indictment. 
I. UNACCOUNTABILITY FOR RACIALIZED POLICE KILLINGS 
Police killings in the United States are pervasive and frequent, and 
the victims are disproportionately people of color.19 Grand jury 
indictments, prosecutions, convictions, and prison sentences for these 
killings are rare. Even when the evidence demonstrates that deadly 
force was not warranted, offending officers are not held accountable. 
This has an impact on the actual and perceived legitimacy of our law 
enforcement organizations and criminal justice system. 
A. Pervasiveness and Recurrence of Racialized Police Killings 
The United States is facing a dual-faceted crisis: frequent police 
killings of people of color and unaccountability for these killings.20 The 
number of police killings in the United States is astonishingly high 
compared to other developed democratic countries, even when 
accounting for differences in population size.21 Police in the United 
States shoot to death more people in a span of mere days and months 
than police in other countries do over years and decades.22 Victims of 
police violence are disproportionately people of color. Over the two-
year period of 2015–2016, Latinos, blacks, and Native Americans were 
respectively 1.15 times, 2.5 times, and 2.7 times more likely to be 
killed by police than whites.23 Law enforcement officers kill over 1,000 
 
 19. For instance, from January 1 to February 9, 2017, police killed 
approximately three people every day in the United States. Mike Blake, Police Killings 
Rise to an Estimated 136 in First 6 Weeks of 2017, RT (Feb. 10, 2017, 11:47 AM), 
[https://perma.cc/V2PS-9BP4]. For statistics on the race of victims of police killings, 
see infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 20. See generally Colin Taylor Ross, Note, Policing Pontius Pilate: Police 
Violence, Local Prosecutors, and Legitimacy, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 755 (2016).  
 21. Jamiles Lartey, By the Numbers: US Police Kill More in Days than Other 
Countries Do in Years, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2015, 6:00 AM EDT), 
[https://perma.cc/YZ3S-YRAW]. 
 22. Id.  
 23. In 2015, 2.95 whites, 3.45 Latinos, 7.69 Blacks, and 5.49 Native 
Americans were killed per million people within their respective racial group. The 
Counted, supra note 8 (referencing the 2015 database tab). In 2016, 2.9 whites, 3.23 
Latinos, 6.66 Blacks, and 10.13 Native Americans were killed per million of people of 
their respective racial group. Id. (referencing the 2016 database tab).  
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people24 every year in the United States. A significant number of these 
victims in 2015 and 2016 were unarmed,25 and many more did not 
present an immediate threat to the officers or public. Only a miniscule 
fraction of these killings are prosecuted, however, and convictions are 
rare. From January 2005 to mid-April 2015, there were only fifty-four 
police officers criminally charged for the shooting deaths of a total of 
forty-nine people.26 Thus, taking into account the estimated number of 
people killed by police in the decade, it appears only 0.05% of all 
police killings result in criminal charges. Each stage of the criminal 
prosecution process yields too little accountability for these deaths. 
B. Prosecutorial Reluctance to Pursue Charges 
Historically, prosecutors have been reluctant to empanel grand 
juries or otherwise initiate criminal proceedings against law 
enforcement officers in deadly force cases.27 Most of the time, 
prosecutors do not seek charges against police—“even if there are 
strong suspicions that an officer has committed a crime.”28 More 
recently, in response to increased public awareness and pressure, 
prosecutors have become more inclined to allow grand juries to 
determine whether police officers should be prosecuted.29 The result has 
been largely the same, however; police are rarely indicted for killing 
people. In fact, “the failure to indict is an anomaly for normal cases, 
 
 24. Jon Swaine & Ciara McCarthy, Killings by US Police Logged at Twice the 
Previous Rate under New Federal Program, GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2016, 5:00 PM 
EST), [https://perma.cc/6J4R-TEUQ] (explaining the Guardian recorded 1,146 police 
homicides in 2015 and 1,025 between January 1 and December 15, 2016). Precise 
numbers of police killings are difficult to ascertain with certainty since it was not until 
2015, after President Barack Obama put pressure on federal authorities that the United 
States’ government began to more accurately count killings by police. Id. Prior to 2015, 
the FBI’s annual count of homicides by police depended entirely on local police chiefs 
voluntarily submitting information. Id. This resulted in a count of less than half of all 
police killings. Id. 
 25. Approximately twenty percent of people killed by police in 2015 and 
fifteen percent in 2016 were unarmed. The Counted, supra note 8 (select the year, click 
on “list” then select “unarmed” from the drop down menu under “filter by”). 
 26. Kindy & Kelly, supra note 9. 
 27. Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Restoring Independence to the Grand Jury: A 
Victim Advocate for Police Use of Force Cases, 65 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 535, 538 (2017). 
 28. Kindy & Kelly, supra note 9. 
 29. Ross, supra note 20, at 761–62 (discussing how local prosecutors are 
increasingly choosing to automatically empanel a grand jury in police killing cases to 
allow the “people” to decide, rather than allowing themselves to be blamed by the 
public for failure to prosecute). 
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but a routine outcome for police cases.”30 For instance, federal grand 
juries indict 99.99% of the time31 but in police killings cases, federal 
grand juries usually fail to vote for indictment.32 Many factors 
contribute to this discrepancy, such as grand jurors’ implicit trust in the 
police33 and prosecutors’ lenient treatment of cases where the offender 
is a law enforcement officer. 
The investigation of the killing of Tamir Rice is a prime example 
of how prosecutors frequently treat police deadly force cases differently 
than cases where the suspects are not law enforcement officers.34 Tamir 
Rice was a twelve-year-old black child from Cleveland, Ohio.35 On the 
afternoon of November 22, 2014, Tamir was playing in a nearly empty 
community park with a toy gun.36 A man calmly called the Cleveland 
Police to report that someone was intermittently brandishing a gun 
outside of the park.37 The caller noted that the gun was likely fake and 
that the person was probably a juvenile, although these details were not 
conveyed to the responding officers Frank Garmback and Timothy 
Loehmann.38 
 
 30. Id. at 764. 
 31. In 2009–10, federal prosecutors initiated approximately 160,000 cases, 
and grand juries only failed to return an indictment for 11 of those cases. MARK 
MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2010 - STATISTICAL 
TABLES 12 (2013), [https://perma.cc/9RF4-QTEU]; Zachary A. Goldfarb, The Single 
Chart that Shows that Federal Grand Juries Indict 99.99 Percent of the Time, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 24, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/11/24/the-single-chart-that-
shows-that-grand-juries-indict-99-99-percent-of-the-time/?utm_term=.28ef87e9d6dd 
(citing MOTIVANS, supra at 11, 12). 
 32. Ross, supra note 20, at 762–63 (citing Ben Casselman, It's Incredibly 
Rare for a Grand Jury to Do What Ferguson's Just Did, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 24, 
2014, 9:30 PM), [https://perma.cc/25WM-WSE9]). University of Illinois Law 
Professor Andrew Leipold noted, “[i]f the prosecutor wants an indictment and doesn't 
get one, something has gone terribly wrong.” Id. 
 33. Kindy & Kelly, supra note 9. 
 34. Ross, supra note 20, at 757; Witmer-Rich, supra note 27, at 538–39.  
 35. Melissa Etehad, Cleveland Policeman Who Shot Tamir Rice is Fired, but 
Not Because of the 12-Year-Old’s Death, L.A. TIMES (May 30, 2017, 6:50 PM),  
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180331163427/http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationn
ow/la-na-tamir-rice-officer-fired-20170530-story.html].  
 36. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Video Shows Cleveland Officer Shot Boy in 2 
Seconds, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/us/video-
shows-cleveland-officer-shot-tamir-rice-2-seconds-after-pulling-up-next-to-him.html. 
 37. Eric Heisig, Tamir Rice Shooting: A Breakdown of the Events that Led to 
the 12-Year-Old’s Death, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 18, 2017, 2:00 PM), 
[https://perma.cc/3SW4-XEDK]. 
 38. Id. 
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Surveillance video footage shows that Officer Garmback drove the 
patrol car at a high speed directly up to the gazebo in the park where 
Tamir was standing alone with nothing in his hands.39 Before the patrol 
car reached a full stop,40 Officer Loehmann leapt out of the passenger 
side and shot Tamir in the chest from barely ten feet away.41 Less than 
two seconds passed from the officers’ arrival and the fatal shot.42 
Officer Loehmann initially claimed that Tamir reached for the gun in 
his waistband, but surveillance video footage revealed that was not 
true.43 After he was shot, the officers did not administer first aid to 
Tamir44 or allow his fourteen-year-old sister to comfort him.45 
Despite the fact that Officer Loehmann’s egregious actions were 
caught on video46 and despite the resulting national outcry,47 state 
authorities were slow to hold him criminally accountable. Nearly six 
months after the killing, investigators still had not even questioned 
Officers Garmback or Loehmann.48 Due to the state’s inaction, private 
 
 39. See Sean Flynn, The Tamir Rice Story: How to Make a Police Shooting 
Disappear, GQ (July 14, 2016), 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180331165228/https://www.gq.com/story/tamir-rice-
story]; News 5 Cleveland, Full Video: Tamir Rice Shooting Video, YOUTUBE (Dec. 3, 
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dw0EMLM1XRI. 
 40. Judgment Entry at 2, In re Affidavits Relating to Timothy Loehmann & 
Frank Garmback (Cleveland Mun. Ct., June 11, 2015) (Adrine, J.) (“On the video, the 
Zone Car containing Patrol Officers Loehmann and Garmback is still in the process of 
stopping when Rice is shot.”). 
 41. Flynn, supra note 39. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Helen A. Anderson, Police Stories, 111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 19, 
25 & n.33 (2016), [https://perma.cc/7X2T-RKDH] (citing Associated Press, Cleveland 
Boy Tamir Rice Wasn't Reaching for Pellet Gun: Report, NBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2015, 
5:20 PM), [https://perma.cc/NQ96-JMUQ]).  
 44. Judgment Entry, supra note 40, at 2 (“Following the shooting, four 
additional minutes pass, during which neither officer approaches Tamir as he lies 
wounded on the ground.”). 
 45. While Tamir lay fatally wounded, Tamir’s fourteen-year-old sister was 
prevented from approaching and comforting him and was instead forced to the ground, 
handcuffed and placed in a patrol car. See Cleveland Police Handcuff Tamir Rice’s 
Sister After Shooting 12-Year-Old – Video, GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2015, 4:36 PM EST), 
[https://perma.cc/3WDN-HM9B]. 
 46. Tamir Rice: Police Release Video of 12–Year–Old’s Fatal Shooting - 
Video, GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2014, 6:07 PM EST), [https://perma.cc/8V42-82FA]. 
 47. Ryllie Danylko, Protests Break Out in Cleveland over Tamir Rice 
Shooting, Ferguson Grand Jury Decision, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 26, 2014), 
[https://perma.cc/9VHN-FN28].  
 48. Jaeah Lee, It’s Been 6 Months Since Tamir Rice Died, and the Cop Who 
Killed Him Still Hasn’t Been Questioned, MOTHER JONES (May 15, 2015, 10:00 AM), 
[https://perma.cc/9QCJ-D6PS]. 
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citizens brought forth a petition and affidavits asking a state judge to 
order the arrests of Loehmann and Garmback.49 On June 11, 2015, 
Judge Ronald B. Adrine responded with a judgment finding probable 
cause that would support charges against Loehmann for murder, 
involuntary manslaughter, reckless homicide, negligent homicide, and 
dereliction of duty, as well as charges against Garmback for negligent 
homicide and dereliction of duty.50 The court noted it was 
“thunderstruck by how quickly this event turned deadly[.]”51 
After Judge Adrine’s finding that probable cause existed to charge 
Officers Loehmann and Garmback, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 
Timothy McGinty issued a statement that a grand jury would decide 
whether the police officers would actually be charged.52 Prosecutor 
McGinty was slow to investigate and commence grand jury 
proceedings, actively sought to exonerate the officers, and ultimately 
“recommended that the grand jurors not bring charges in the killing of 
the boy, Tamir Rice.”53 This type of action (and inaction) by 
prosecutors in homicide cases which do not involve law enforcement 
would be highly unusual but is increasingly common in cases where the 
suspects are police officers accused of killing people of color. 
C. Grand Juries Fail to Indict 
A grand jury was eventually empaneled against Officers Loehmann 
and Garmback, but the grand jury took Prosecutor McGinty’s 
recommendation and failed to indict.54 Similar to other high-profile 
police killing cases—including those for the police killings of Michael 
Brown55 and Eric Garner56—prosecutors in the case of the killing of 
 
 49. Judgment Entry, supra note 40, at 1. 
 50. Id. at 8–9. 
 51. Id. at 2. 
 52. Dana Ford, Judge: Probable Cause to Charge Cleveland Officers in Tamir 
Rice Case, CNN (June 11, 2015, 9:53 PM ET), [https://perma.cc/M9QZ-7J8U]. 
 53. Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith, Cleveland Officer Will Not Face 
Charges in Tamir Rice Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/us/tamir-rice-police-shootiing-cleveland.html. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Michael Brown was a black, eighteen-year-old, unarmed recent high 
school graduate fatally shot by white police officer Darren Wilson on August 9, 2014 in 
Ferguson, Missouri. Frances Robles & Julia Bosman, Autopsy Shows Michael Brown 
was Struck at Least 6 Times, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/18/us/michael-brown-autopsy-shows-he-was-shot-at-
least-6-times.html; Ferguson Protests: What We Know About Michael Brown’s Last 
Minutes, BBC (Nov. 25, 2014), [https://perma.cc/ZBP3-29M8].  
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Tamir Rice “conducted what appeared to be an extensive full-blown 
‘trial’ before the grand jury,” instead of the regular brief and cursory 
presentations focused on passing the low hurdle of probable cause.57 In 
all three of these cases, the jury failed to indict.58 Normally, in 
homicide cases where the suspects are not police officers, prosecutors 
are eager to get an indictment and do so easily. However, police killing 
cases are treated differently. The oft-repeated saying that a grand jury 
would “indict a ham sandwich” if instructed to do so by a prosecutor 
does not appear to apply to prosecutions of white police officers 
charged with killing black Americans.59 
In police killing cases, prosecutors sometimes actually intimate to 
the jury that an indictment is undesirable. In the grand jury convened to 
consider the killing of Tamir Rice, Prosecutor McGinty went so far as 
to hire experts to testify to the grand jury that the shooting was 
reasonable.60 Further, the two officers were permitted to give self-
serving statements without being subjected to cross-examination, and 
the police-use-of-force experts who testified that the officers’ use of 
force was unreasonable “were treated with hostility and aggressive 
cross-examination by the prosecutors.”61 These expert witnesses and 
others have claimed that the prosecution used “theatrics” to signal to 
the jurors that the officers should not be charged and acted more like 
 
 56. On July 17, 2014, Eric Garner was arrested in Staten Island, New York 
on suspicion of selling loose, single cigarettes. An NYPD officer put Mr. Garner in a 
chokehold while arresting him. Garner told officers “I can’t breathe” eleven times but 
the officer did not let up. He was pronounced dead one hour later. ‘I Can’t Breathe’: 
Eric Garner Put in a Chokehold by NYPD Officer – Video, GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2014, 
2:46 PM EST), [https://perma.cc/MVU3-CQFE]; Amy Davidson Sorkin, Safer Streets, 
NEW YORKER (Dec. 15, 2014), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/15/safer-streets.  
 57. Witmer-Rich, supra note 27, at 539. 
 58. Lauren Gambino, Eric Garner: Grand Jury Declines to Indict NYPD 
Officer over Chokehold Death, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2014, 5:43 PM EST), 
[https://perma.cc/77W5-RGPV]; Jon Swaine et al., Grand Jury Decline to Charge 
Darren Wilson for Killing Michael Brown, GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2014, 4:23 AM EST), 
[https://perma.cc/KN23-VYMA]; William & Smith, supra note 53. 
 59. See Christopher Hooton, A Grand Jury Could ‘Indict a Ham Sandwich,’ 





 60. Williams & Smith, supra note 53. 
 61. Witmer-Rich, supra note 27, at 555. 
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“defense counsel” than prosecutors.62 Prosecutor McGinty even made 
statements implicitly blaming young Tamir for his own death.63 
Grand jury proceedings are usually cursory events which present 
one-sided evidence bent on securing an indictment against the suspect.64 
Conversely, likely due to local prosecutors’ reluctance to bring charges 
against local law enforcement officers with whom they work closely, 
grand jury proceedings in police killing cases are often more akin to a 
non-adversarial mini-trial crafted to exonerate the officers.65 Since 
grand jury proceedings are held in secrecy and prosecutors control the 
proceedings, “[m]any observers now see the process as a way for 
prosecutors to hold a secret, skewed trial for a police officer 
defendant.”66 
D. Juries Fail to Convict 
In the atypical case where a grand jury elects to indict a police 
officer for a killing, the excessive use of force must have been 
particularly flagrant.67 The “overwhelming majority” of these cases 
involved an unarmed victim, “[b]ut it usually took more than that,” 
such as “a victim shot in the back, a video recording of the incident, 
incriminating testimony from other officers or allegations of a 
coverup.”68 Specifically, in about half of the cases that survive the 
grand jury, the victim was shot from behind.69 In one-third of the cases, 
videos show that the victims posed no threat at the time they were 
killed.70 “In nearly a quarter of the cases, an officer’s colleagues turned 
on him, giving statements or testifying that the officer opened fire even 
though the suspect posed no danger at the time.”71 “[A]bout a fifth of 
the time, prosecutors alleged that officers either planted or destroyed 
 
 62. Flynn, supra note 39.  
 63. Daniel Marans, How a Prosecutor Managed to Blame a 12-Year-Old for 
Getting Killed by a Cop, HUFFPOST (Dec. 29, 2015, 11:22 PM), 
[https://perma.cc/6UDV-5CQT].  
 64. See Jeffrey Toobin, How Not to Use a Grand Jury, NEW YORKER (Nov. 
25, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/use-grand-jury. 
 65. See Ross, supra note 20, at 763–64 (discussing grand juries related to the 
police killings of Michael Brown and Tamir Rice).  
 66. Id. at 764 (citing Dahlia Lithwick & Sonja West, Shadow Trial, SLATE 
(Nov. 26, 2014, 4:35 PM), [https://perma.cc/ULN2-4FBN]).  
 67. Kindy & Kelly, supra note 9. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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evidence in an attempt to exonerate themselves,” indicating “that the 
officers themselves recognized the shooting was unjustified.”72 
According to Philip M. Stinson, a criminologist at Bowling Green State 
University, “[t]o charge an officer in a fatal shooting, it takes 
something so egregious, so over the top that it cannot be explained in 
any rational way[.]”73 However, even in these most egregious cases, 
the majority of officers are not convicted.74 
Defendant police officers are usually acquitted or not retried after 
their proceedings result in mistrials due to hung juries. Of the fifty-four 
officers criminally charged from 2005–2015, only twenty-six have been 
convicted (either after a finding of guilt or entering a guilty plea).75 
Five of these convictions were for the single event of the Danziger 
Bridge tragedy, where unarmed black survivors of Hurricane Katrina 
sought assistance and were gunned down by police officers who then 
attempted to cover up the killings.76 
Some of the remaining twenty-one convictions for this decade of 
police killings were for significantly lesser offenses than originally 
charged. For instance, Richard Combs, the white police chief of 
Eutawville, South Carolina was charged and tried for the murder of an 
unarmed black man named Bernard Bailey, but ultimately pled guilty to 
 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Police Officers Prosecuted for Use of Deadly Force, WASH. POST (Apr. 
11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings/; 
Ray Sanchez, Charging the Police: By the Numbers, CNN (Sept. 23, 2016, 3:24 PM 
ET), [https://perma.cc/P9EL-6DF3]. Notably, there is a general lack of comprehensive 
data on police crime. Philip Stinson and fellow researchers have sought to fill this void 
and, in doing so, confirm the low arrest and conviction rate of police. See, e.g., PHILIP 
MATTHEW STINSON, SR. ET AL., POLICE INTEGRITY LOST: A STUDY OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ARRESTED (2016); Philip M. Stinson, Police Shootings Data: 
What We Know and What We Don’t Know, CRIM. JUST. PUBLICATIONS (Apr. 20, 2017), 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180406222217/https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1077&context=crim_just_pub] [hereinafter Police Shootings Data] 
(showing that in 2015, alone, 991 fatal on-duty police killings, only 2% were 
considered “not justified” and resulted in the arrest of the offending officer).  
 76. John Burnett, Verdict in Katrina Shooting Buoys Police Reform, NPR 
(Aug. 18, 2011, 12:01 AM ET), 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180331195706/https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/04/20/474973779/5-former-new-orleans-police-officers-enter-guilty-pleas-
over-danziger-bridge-kil]; Bill Chappell, 5 Former New Orleans Police Officers Plead 
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misconduct in office.77 In 2011, Combs chased down and shot into 
Bailey’s vehicle when he tried to arrest him on a trumped-up 
obstruction of justice charge, weeks after the two had argued about 
Bailey’s daughter’s traffic ticket for a broken taillight.78 Combs was 
prosecuted for murder and voluntary manslaughter in two separate 
trials.79 The first jury voted 9–3 to convict Combs, and the second jury 
voted 8–4 for conviction.80 Both resulted in mistrials since the juries 
were unable to reach a unanimous verdict.81 Rather than be tried a third 
time, Combs pled guilty to the minor misconduct charge.82 
E. Judges Fail to Punish 
Of those police officers successfully convicted of an offense, most 
served little prison time, if any. Those who did serve time received 
relatively short sentences. The average prison time for a police officer 
convicted of killing someone is four years.83 This is less than half the 
average sentence for non-police officers who are convicted of similar 
crimes.84 Some convicted officers received no prison time, such as 
 
 77. Alan Blinder, Rural Justice Focus of Ex-Police Chief’s Murder Trial, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/us/richard-combs-
bernard-bailey-shooting-case.html. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Associated Press, Ex–Police Chief who Shot Unarmed Black Man Avoids 
Jail with Plea Deal, GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2015, 5:06 PM EDT), 
[https://perma.cc/ANC4-JQVJ]. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id.  
 83. Kindy & Kelly, supra note 9. 
 84. For example, between 2009 and 2010, the average minimum term of 
imprisonment for homicide-related offenses was over 8.5 years, and an average 
aggregate sentence of nearly 12 years imprisonment. ISABEL TAUSSIG, NSW BUREAU OF 
CRIME STATISTICS & RESEARCH, SENTENCING SNAPSHOT: HOMICIDE AND RELATED 
OFFENCES 3 (2012), http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Documents/BB/bb76.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BEM2-JV8G]. Between 2005 and 2017, by contrast, police convicted 
of on-duty shooting crimes were sentenced to an average total term of 48 months, or 
four years of incarceration, and most often, were sentenced to 0 (zero) months of 
incarceration. Police Shootings Data, supra note 75; see also Alexa P. Freeman, 
Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention of Just Sentencing for Police Brutality, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 677, 680 (1996) (“In many instances, police officers manage to avoid 
prison altogether for criminal acts that, if committed by civilians, would lead to many 
years imprisonment. When police do go to prison, it is often for a fraction of the 
sentence that normally results from a particular crime. This is so even when their 
brutality causes permanent disability or death.”). 
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Officer Combs after he pled guilty to misconduct.85 Similarly, another 
white police officer from South Carolina, Justin Craven, who fatally 
shot a sixty-eight-year-old black motorist, Ernest Satterwhite, received 
a sentence of probation.86 The killing was captured on the police cruiser 
dash cam.87 The prosecution sought manslaughter charges, but a grand 
jury chose to indict for misconduct in office; Craven pled out, resulting 
in no prison time.88 In the past ten years, from 2007 to 2017, only five 
white police officers have served prison time for killing black people,89 
despite the fact that, on average, police (who are disproportionately 
white)90 kill an unarmed black man every nine days.91 
F. The Impact of Unaccountability 
Unaccountability for police killings of people of color has a broad 
impact on our nation. It not only leaves the victims’ loved ones 
devastated, it also disheartens communities of color. When trial juries 
routinely acquit defendants of racialized police violence, the legal 
system “sends the message that black males [and other men and women 
of color] are entitled to less physical safety than whites.”92 
Discriminatory acquittals not only convey “that [the] government will 
provide less protection from violence based on race,” but they also 
“enforce the racial . . . order.”93 Further, it causes the general public to 
 
 85. Associated Press, supra note 79. 
 86. South Carolina Officer Gets Probation in Black Driver’s Shooting, CHI. 
TRIB. (Apr. 11, 2016, 10:35 PM), 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180331204333/http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/n
ationworld/ct-south-carolina-police-shooting-ernest-satterwhite-20160411-story.html]. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Michael Harriot, White Men Can’t Murder: Why White Cops Are Immune 
to the Law, ROOT (June 22, 2017, 1:28 PM), 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180331204734/https://www.theroot.com/white-men-
cant-murder-why-white-cops-are-immune-to-the-1796309966]. 
 90. Jeremy Ashkenas & Haeyoun Park, The Race Gap in America’s Police 
Departments, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/03/us/the-race-gap-in-americas-
police-departments.html. 
 91. Nancy C. Marcus, From Edward to Eric Garner and Beyond: The 
Importance of Constitutional Limitations on Lethal Use of Force in Police Reform, 12 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 67 (2016) (noting police killed an average of one 
unarmed black man every nine days in 2015).  
 92. Andrew E. Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law, 28 SW. 
U. L. REV. 171, 215 (1999). 
 93. Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, supra note 15, at 79. 
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lose faith in policing and the criminal justice system. Prosecutors’ 
failure to pursue charges, grand juries’ failure to indict, trial juries’ 
failure to convict, and judges’ light sentencing in police deadly force 
cases have a significant impact on the American people and on the 
actual and perceived legitimacy of our criminal justice legal system.94 
There are undoubtedly many contributing reasons for the 
unaccountability for police killings of racial minorities. As Devon 
Carbado has elucidated, the causes of “Blue-on-Black” violence are 
manifold:95 a convergence of social forces subjecting blacks to ongoing 
police surveillance; the frequency of police surveillance exposes blacks 
to increased opportunities for police violence; police culture and 
training which encourage violence; translation of police violence into 
“justifiable force” by the law and legal actors; qualified immunity that 
prevents civil recovery; and local government indemnification which 
limits financial consequences to offending officers—all of which leave 
little incentive for law enforcement to exercise care toward 
communities of color.96 This Article focuses on one often 
underexplored aspect of this phenomena: the role of evidence law. It 
scrutinizes racialized police killings under the lens of a critical 
evidentiary inquiry, specifically targeting the problem of racial 
character evidence, and proposes evidence law solutions. 
II. RACIAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND ITS ROLE IN POLICE 
KILLING CASES 
When a law enforcement officer is criminally prosecuted for 
killing a victim of color, the actual charges may vary. Generally, 
irrespective of the charged offense(s), the primary question the jury will 
consider is: Was the officer reasonably afraid for his or her life or the 
lives of others when he or she used deadly force?97 Police have broad 
 
 94. See Kami Chavis Simmons, Increasing Police Accountability: Restoring 
Trust and Legitimacy Through the Appointment of Independent Prosecutors, 49 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 137, 139 (2015) (“[R]ecent public outrage reached a fever pitch when 
officers were not held criminally responsible for recent high-profile deaths.”). 
 95. Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of 
Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479 (2016). 
 96. Id. at 1479. See also Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to 
Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. 
L. REV. 125 (2017) (discussing the connection between police killings of African 
Americans with the legalization of racial profiling in Fourth Amendment law).  
 97. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 
471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985). 
GONZALES ROSE – CAMERA READY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/2018  11:15 AM 
2018:369 Racial Character Evidence 387 
 
authority to use deadly force,98 and, as discussed above, they are not 
usually prosecuted unless the evidence against them is extraordinarily 
strong.99 Generally, there is little evidence that the victim posed a 
threat, aside from the defendant officer’s own self-serving testimony. 
Often, video evidence or eyewitness testimony actually provides 
evidence that neither the officer nor anyone else was in imminent risk 
of harm.100 However, even when the evidence against the officer is 
overwhelming, juries still acquit.101 
Jurors (or judges in a bench trial) acquit because they believe the 
officer. They believe it was reasonable for the officer to perceive the 
victim of color as threatening. They find that the officer was honest and 
credible on the stand. In contrast, they find that the eyewitnesses—often 
people of color—were not credible. Ultimately, it comes down to 
character: of the victim, the defendant, and witnesses. Often, race itself 
serves as character evidence, and reliance on racial character evidence 
can be outcome determinative.102 
A. Racial Character Evidence in General 
1. OVERVIEW OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
Character evidence is based on the commonsense notion that 
someone who has lived a morally righteous, honest, and peaceful life is 
more likely to have acted in accordance with that character during the 
event in question or on the stand.103 Likewise, someone who has led a 
morally corrupt, dishonest, or violent life is more likely to have acted 
consistently with those traits during the incident at issue or while 
 
 98. Peggy Triplett, Police Use of Deadly Force: Research Efforts of the 
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, in A COMMUNITY 
CONCERN: POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 61 (Robert N. Brenner & Marjorie Kravitz 
eds., 1979),  [https://perma.cc/EX2L-GZKB]; Ross, supra note 20, at 758 (citing 
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (“The ‘reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be 
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer in the scene, rather than with the 
20/20 vision of hindsight.”)). 
 99. Kindy & Kelly, supra note 9. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See supra Part I.D. 
 102. Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2265 (citing Carodine, supra note 2, at 
679); see also Montré D. Carodine, “The Mis-Characterization of the Negro”: A Race 
Critique of the Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 527 (2009). 
 103. See Barrett J. Anderson, Recognizing Character: A New Perspective on 
Character Evidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1912, 1926–28 (2012) (explaining the basic logic 
behind a character propensity argument). 
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testifying.104 Although the character of a party, witness, or victim may 
be probative, judging someone by the type of person they are or their 
past, unrelated actions goes against the well-established Anglo-
American legal principle that a person should be judged on the basis of 
his or her conduct on the particular occasion and not on the basis of his 
or her character.105 Thus, character evidence, whether for good or bad 
traits, is generally prohibited at trial.106 
There are exceptions to the general character propensity ban. In 
criminal trials, defendants can often introduce opinion or reputation107 
evidence of their or a victim’s pertinent character trait.108 For instance, 
when a defendant is charged with homicide, manslaughter, or other 
offense related to killing someone, a defendant could call a character 
witness to testify that the defendant is peaceful and non-violent and that 
the victim was violent and aggressive. The defendant’s introduction of 
character evidence comes with risks. When a defendant affirmatively 
offers character evidence about themselves or a victim, the defendant 
opens the door to character evidence. The prosecution can respond with 
opinion or reputation character evidence about the defendant’s or 
victim’s matching trait.109 Further, in homicide cases where a defendant 
claims the victim was the first aggressor, the prosecution can introduce 
evidence of the victim’s character for peacefulness, even if the 
defendant did not introduce character evidence.110 Moreover, in both 
criminal and civil trials, once a witness testifies, his or her credibility 
for truthfulness can be impeached.111 Only after a witness’s credibility 
has been attacked, can a party bolster his or her witness’s credibility 
with good character evidence for truthfulness.112 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. David P. Leonard, Character and Motive in Evidence Law, 34 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 439, 450 (2001).  
 106. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (providing that “[e]vidence of a person’s 
character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the 
person acted in accordance with the charter or trait”).  
 107. FED. R. EVID. 405 (“When evidence of a person’s character or character 
trait is admissible, it may be proved by testimony about the person’s reputation or by 
testimony in the form of an opinion.”). 
 108. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A) & (B).  
 109. Id. 
 110. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(C). 
 111. FED. R. EVID. 608(a). 
 112. Id. 
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2. OVERVIEW OF RACIAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
Racial character evidence is where a person’s—whether it be a 
party, witness, or victim—race is considered by a fact-finder as proof 
of the person’s character: the type of person they are and their 
propensity to act in certain ways.113 Implicit racial preferences and 
stereotypes about characteristics of racial groups are used to determine 
whether the defendant, witness, or victim is (or was) peaceful or 
violent, honest or dishonest, or a variety of other characteristics.114 
Racial character evidence is rooted in racial stereotypes.115 
There are many prevalent (but unfounded) racial stereotypes in the 
United States. For instance, common stereotypes about blacks are that 
they are criminally-inclined, violent, aggressive, physically powerful, 
dishonest, shiftless, and drug users.116 Stereotypes about Latinos are 
that they are “illegal” immigrants—which indicates both a law-breaking 
nature and foreignness—untrustworthy, gang members, drug 
traffickers, and the men sexist and oppressive towards women.117 
 
 113. Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2262 (“In today’s criminal justice system, 
blackness and brownness are frequently de facto ‘evidence’ of bad character, while 
whiteness is de facto ‘evidence’ of good character. In this Article, I refer to this 
phenomena as ‘racial character evidence.’”); see also Montré D. Carodine, Race Is 
Evidence: (Mis)Characterizing Blackness in the American Civil Rights Story, in CIVIL 
RIGHTS IN AMERICAN LAW, HISTORY, AND POLITICS 64–67 (Austin Sarat ed. 2014). 
 114. Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2264. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Lei Guo & Summer Harlow, User-Generated Racism: An Analysis of 
Stereotypes of African Americans, Latinos, and Asians in YouTube Videos, 25 HOW. J. 
COMM. 281, 286 (2014) (citing JOHN DOWNING & CHARLES HUSBAND, REPRESENTING 
‘RACE’: RACISMS, ETHNICITY AND THE MEDIA 27 (2005); Linus Abraham & Osei 
Appiah, Framing News Stories: The Role of Visual Imagery in Priming Racial 
Stereotypes, 17 HOW. J. COMM. 183 (2006)) (“[R]acial stereotypes tend[] to link Blacks 
with dangerous, criminal behavior, portraying them as poor, uneducated and violent.”); 
see also Jennifer S. Hunt, Race, Ethnicity, and Culture in Jury Decision Making, 11 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 269, 280 (2015) (citing William J. Bowers et al., Death 
Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and 
Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 265–66 (2001)) (“Post-trial 
interviews of capital jurors show that White jurors, especially men, are more likely to 
have negative views of defendants, seeing them as vicious and dangerous individuals 
who made their victims suffer.”); D. Aaron Lacy, The Most Endangered Title VII 
Plaintiff?: Exponential Discrimination Against Black Males, 86 NEB. L. REV. 552, 564 
(2008) (“[T]he stereotypes related to Blackness are athletic, incompetent, guilty, 
unworthy, occupational instability, primitive morality, threatening, and dangerous.”). 
 117. See Guo & Harlow, supra note 116 (citations omitted) (“Latinos, 
especially Latino immigrants, often are portrayed in the news as criminals, invaders, a 
threat to national security, culturally different, and job thieves.”); see also Andrew W. 
Bribriesco, Note, Latino/a Plaintiffs and the Intersection of Stereotypes, Unconscious 
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“Native Americans are frequently stereotyped as alcoholic, 
untrustworthy, violent, and prone to crime.”118 American Indians 
historically and contemporarily are also stereotyped as “wild” and 
“savage,” in a variety of contexts including case law.119 Middle Eastern 
and Arab Americans are stereotyped as terrorists and tyrannical toward 
women.120 Stereotypes about Asian-Americans oscillate between myths 
of “yellow peril” and “model minority,” and include that they are 
overly-reserved, unfeeling, disloyal, shifty, tricky, hard-working, 
academically-inclined, and foreign.121 While it is generally assumed that 
racial stereotypes only apply to racial minorities, whites are also subject 
to racial stereotyping, although usually to their benefit.122 Whites are 
generally considered honest, truthful, law-abiding, reasonable, and—
most notably—normal.123 
These racial stereotypes are carried into the courtroom where 
jurors (and judges in bench trials) are tasked with assessing the 
credibility of witnesses and discerning the facts of the case. A witness’s 
race might be considered in determining whether he or she was honest 
or dishonest when testifying on the stand.124 The race of a victim or 
 
Bias, Race-Neutral Polices, and Personal Injury, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 373, 
400–01 (2010) (citations omitted) (“Jurors possess the stereotype that Latinos are 
untrustworthy and dishonest . . . . less intelligent . . . [and] . . . foreigners.”). 
 118. Aliya Saperstein et al., The Criminal Justice System and the Racialization 
of Perceptions, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 104, 107 (2014); see also 
Walter C. Fleming, Myths and Stereotypes About Native Americans, 88 PHI DELTA 
KAPPAN 213, 213 (2006).  
 119. See generally Ann E. Tweedy, “Hostile Indian Tribes . . . Outlaws, 
Wolves, . . . Bears . . . Grizzlies and Things like That?” How the Second Amendment 
and Supreme Court Precedent Target Tribal Self-Defense, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 687 
(2011). 
 120. Rachel Saloom, You Dropped a Bomb on Me, Denmark—A Legal 
Examination of the Cartoon Controversy and Response as it Relates to the Prophet 
Muhammad and Islamic Law, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 1, 22–25 (2006). 
 121. See generally Colin Ho & Jay W. Jackson, Attitudes Toward Asian 
Americans: Theory and Measurement, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1553 (2001). 
 122. See, e.g., Bribriesco, supra note 117, at 400–01 (pointing out that many 
of the stereotypes exist relative to other social groups, “primarily Whites”); Wesley G. 
Jennings et al., A Critical Examination of the “White Victim Effect” and Death Penalty 
Decision-Making from a Propensity Score Matching Approach: The North Carolina 
Experience, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 384, 385 (2014) (citation omitted) (explaining the “White 
victim effect” as rooted in the erroneous assumption that “crime and violence among 
Blacks [is] ‘normative’ and Whites [is] atypical”). 
 123. See Lacy, supra note 116, at 564 (“There are many classical stereotypes 
related to Whiteness. Some adjectives include innocence, worthiness, competence, 
collegial, articulate, intelligent, and non-threatening.”). 
 124. See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the 
Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261 (1996). 
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defendant may be relied upon to determine whether they were violent 
or peaceful, or more specifically, whether during the event in question 
they were the first aggressor or reluctant to resort to violence and only 
acted in self-defense.125 An example that will be discussed in detail is 
how “[r]acial stereotypes about Black men as dangerous, violent 
criminals may encourage jurors to see the victim’s actions as 
threatening and the defendant’s actions as reasonable.”126 
3. PEÑA-RODRIGUEZ V. COLORADO: A RACIAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
CASE STUDY 
The Peña-Rodriguez case127 provides a clear example of a juror’s 
explicit use of racial character evidence. In May 2007, a Latino man 
entered a women’s restroom at a Colorado horse-racing track.128 The 
man asked two teenage sisters whether they would like to drink or 
“party.”129 The girls declined, and when they tried to leave, the man 
turned off the light and grabbed the girls’ shoulders, moving his hands 
towards one girl’s breast and the other girl’s buttocks.130 The girls 
quickly exited the restroom and told their father who worked at the 
racetrack.131 The girls described the man and said they thought he was 
also employed at the racetrack.132 Their father thought the man 
described was Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez and reported the incident 
to the racetrack’s security personnel, who in turn contacted the 
police.133 Later that night, the police seized Peña-Rodriguez, and the 
girls identified him in a show-up as the assailant.134 
Peña-Rodriguez was charged with felony attempted sexual assault 
on a child, as well as the misdemeanor offenses of unlawful sexual 
contact and sexual harassment.135 At trial, Peña-Rodriguez’s defense 
 
 125. See generally Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a 
Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996). 
 126. Cynthia Lee, A New Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 U.C. IRVINE 
L. REV. 843, 859 (2015); see also Thompson, supra note 12, at 322–23. 
 127. 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). 
 128. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 
(2017) (No. 15-606). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 4–5. 
 131. Id. at 5. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
GONZALES ROSE – CAMERA READY  (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/2018  11:15 AM 
392 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
 
was misidentification.136 The prosecution’s evidence consisted primarily 
of the pretrial and in-court identification.137 The defendant did not 
testify but called an alibi witness, who was also Latino.138 The jury 
found him guilty on the misdemeanor charges but were unable to come 
to a conclusion on the attempted sexual assault charge, and as a result, 
the court declared a mistrial as to this felony charge.139 He was 
sentenced to two years’ probation and had to register as a sex 
offender.140 
After the verdict, two jurors approached defense counsel and 
reported that fellow Juror H.C. had made multiple racially-biased 
statements.141 After securing permission from the trial court, defense 
counsel obtained affidavits from the two jurors about Juror H.C.’s 
statements.142 One of Juror H.C.’s statements included: “I think [Peña-
Rodriguez] did it because he’s Mexican and Mexican men take 
whatever they want.”143 Juror H.C made other statements concerning 
Mexican men being “physically controlling of women because of their 
sense of entitlement” and that they “can take whatever they want” with 
women.144 He also said he “believed that the defendant was guilty 
because in [his] experience as an ex-law enforcement officer, Mexican 
men had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever 
they wanted with women.”145 He specified that “nine times out of ten 
Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young 
girls.”146 Finally, concerning the defendant’s alibi witness, Juror H.C. 
stated he “did not find the petitioner’s alibi witness credible because, 
among other things, he was ‘an illegal.’”147 
Juror H.C.’s statement, “I think he did it because he’s Mexican” is 
an incredibly clear and blatant example of racial character evidence.148 
The inference is that the defendant is guilty because of his racialized 
 
 136. Id. at 5–6.  
 137. Id. at 6. 
 138. Brief for Respondent at 8, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 
(2017) (No. 15-606). 
 139. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 128, at 7. 
 140. Id. at 9. 
 141. Id. at 7–8. 
 142. Id. at 8. 
 143. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 862. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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background. The juror’s other statements explain the racial character 
propensity chain of inferences: (1) the defendant is Mexican; (2) 
Mexican men have a propensity to take whatever they want, are 
physically controlling of women, have a sense of entitlement that they 
can do whatever they want with females, have a bravado, and are 
frequently guilty of being aggressive towards females; (3) on the night 
in question defendant was Mexican and thus, acted in accordance with 
the character of a Mexican; (4) hence, it is likely he entered the 
bathroom, touched the teenage girls in a sexual manner, and attempted 
to sexually assault them; (5) therefore, he is guilty of the offenses 
charged. 
The racial character propensity reasoning here is that Mexican men 
are sexual offenders, and since the defendant is Mexican then he must 
be guilty of the charged sexual offenses, is based on racial bias. 
Although the juror couched his assumptions about the character of 
Mexican men in terms of his personal observations and professional 
work experience as a police officer, decades earlier,149 these 
assumptions are based on widely-held racist stereotypes.150 Juror H.C.’s 
statement likely resonated with other jurors because of the prevalence 
of such stereotypes. An example of the pervasiveness and tolerance of 
this stereotype is that Donald Trump commenced his successful 
presidential campaign claiming that Mexican immigrants were rapists 
and a threat to the United States.151 As jurors discussed the evidence in 
the case, Juror H.C. put forth racial character evidence and tried to 
persuade other jurors that Peña-Rodriguez was guilty of the charged 
sexual offenses because he is Latino.152 The juror also acted as an 
“expert” opinion witness of sorts in the deliberation room, relying upon 
his expertise as a former police officer to convince his fellow jurors 
that they should return a verdict of guilt.153 
 
 149. Brief for Respondent, supra note 138, at 13. 
 150. See Celia Jaes Falicov, Changing Constructions of Machismo for Latino 
Men in Therapy: “The Devil Never Sleeps”, 49 FAM. PROCESS 309 (2010). 
 151. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting 
Mexican Immigrants and Crime, WASH. POST (July 8, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-
false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/?utm_term=.a66d8b1faf16. 
 152. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017). The use of 
racial character evidence to determine guilt for sexual assault is particularly troubling 
because it is reminiscent of when being black was de facto evidence of rape. See 
Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at Part II.A.; Bennett Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, 
87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1345 (2010); Carodine, supra note 2, at 680–81. 
 153. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 870 (“Not only did juror H.C. deploy a 
dangerous racial stereotype to conclude petitioner was guilty and his alibi witness 
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Not only did Juror H.C. find that the defendant’s Latino 
background confirmed that he was guilty, the juror found the 
defendant’s alibi witness was not credible because he was also 
Latino.154 Specifically, the juror “did not find petitioner’s alibi witness 
credible because, among other things, he was ‘an illegal.’”155 “Illegal” 
is a racialized label attached to Latinos in the United States.156 The 
undisputed evidence in the record was that the alibi witness was a 
lawful permanent resident of the United States, and thus legally 
present.157 However, the juror still concluded that the alibi witness was 
“an illegal.”158 This is not merely a mistaken notion of an individual’s 
immigration status; it is a prevalent racist stereotype and a tolerated 
racial slur against Latinos. Despite the reality that the majority of 
Latinos—including people of Mexican descent—in the United States are 
citizens or otherwise lawfully present,159 racist assumptions that Latinos 
are foreign and “illegals” prevail. Latinos, especially those of Mexican 
descent, are branded “illegal” and assumed to be criminally inclined 
and dishonest.160 Here, Juror H.C. observed the alibi witness’s 
appearance, assumed he was an “illegal” because he appeared and 
sounded Latino, and concluded he was accordingly dishonest. 
Ultimately, it is evident that Juror H.C. based his vote to convict the 
 
should not be believed, but he also encouraged other jurors to join him in convicting on 
that basis.”). 
 154. Id. at 862.  
 155. Id. 
 156. See Guo & Harlow, supra note 116 (explaining how Latinos are often 
portrayed as criminals and invaders). 
 157. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 862 (“In fact, the witness testified during 
trial that he was a legal resident of the United States.”). 
 158. Id. 
 159. In fact, the majority of Latinos in the country are born in the United 
States. Jens Manuel Krogstad, 10 Facts for National Hispanic Heritage Month, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Sept. 15, 2016), [https://perma.cc/BS5Y-UQDG] (explaining the 
percentage of U.S. Latinos who are foreign-born decreased from forty percent to thirty-
five percent between 2007 and 2014). 
 160. David G. Embrick, Two Nations, Revisited: The Lynching of Black and 
Brown Bodies, Police Brutality, and Racial Control in ‘Post-Racial’ Amerikkka, 41 
CRITICAL SOC. 835, 840 (2015) (“And violence toward Latino/as by the police are 
routinely dismissed as Latino/as are often seen as ‘illegal’ in the US and therefore 
criminal, and deserving of whatever punishment they receive . . . .”); Derek Hawkins, 
The Long Struggle Over What to Call ‘Undocumented Immigrants’ or, as Trump Said in 
His Order, ‘Illegal Aliens’, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/02/09/when-trump-says-
illegals-immigrant-advocates-recoil-he-would-have-been-all-right-in-
1970/?utm_term=.c667aafaeea6; see also supra note 117 and accompanying 
discussion. 
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defendant, persuading other jurors to follow suit, on the basis of racial 
character evidence. 
B. Racial Character Evidence in Police Killing Cases 
Racial character evidence is not only used against a defendant or 
witness in a criminal trial. Racial character evidence can also apply to a 
victim, including a deceased victim. This is typical in deadly force or 
self-defense scenarios where the deceased victim was a person of 
color.161 It is also important to note that racial character evidence is not 
always negative. It can be used in favor of a racialized group.162 Jurors 
serving on grand and petit juries in police deadly force cases can be 
particularly susceptible to the use of racial character evidence because 
the majority of police killings are committed by white (or non-black) 
police officers with an overrepresentation of victims being people of 
color.163 
Even when the officer is a person of color, the victim’s blackness 
can still be used against him or her. Studies have shown that non-whites 
also hold implicit racial bias against blacks and are more likely to 
perceive a black person as dangerous and armed.164 Further, in rooting 
out racial subordination the focus should be more on the outcome than 
the race of the perpetrator. “The contemporary system of race and 
racism does not require intentional race-based discrimination or 
animus, but instead centers on whites collectively receiving privileges 
and benefits from the systemic subordination of non-whites.”165 The 
killing of black persons subordinates the black victims, their families, 
their communities, and blacks as a population who experience a 
 
 161. See Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2265–68. 
 162. Id. at 2260–61.  
 163. See supra note 23; see also Kindy & Kelly, supra note 9. 
 164. See Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, 
Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 357 (2007) (stating that 
“‘shooter bias’ refers to participants’ propensity to shoot Black perpetrators more 
quickly and more frequently than White perpetrators and to decide not to shoot White 
bystanders more quickly and frequently than Black bystanders. Studies have also shown 
that participants more quickly identify handguns as weapons after seeing a Black face . 
. . .”). See also Saul L. Miller et al., The Basis of Shooter Biases: Beyond Cultural 
Stereotypes, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1358 (2012) (citing that black 
men are stereotyped as dangerous and finding in a study that black men are often 
erroneously assumed to be armed).  
 165. Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2251–52 (citing Frances Lee Ansley, 
Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL 
L. REV. 993, 1023–24 (1989)). 
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diminished sense of safety and freedom.166 Commentators have made 
analogies between recent police killings of unarmed blacks and lynching 
in the Jim Crow era167 because both are demonstrations of white control 
over blacks.168 Police killings and the resultant fear of future killings 
yield white dominance, irrespective of whether the officer is white or a 
person of color. The race of the police officer who kills a black person 
does not negate the presence of structural racism.169 
1. CASE STUDY: PROSECUTION OF JERONIMO YANEZ FOR 
KILLING PHILANDO CASTILE 
The recent trial and acquittal of Latino police officer Jeronimo 
Yanez for the killing of Philando Castile, a thirty-two-year-old black 
man,170 provides an illustration of juror reliance on racial character 
evidence in police killing cases. On the evening of July 6, 2016, in a 
suburb of Saint Paul, Minnesota,171 Yanez saw Castile drive past and 
noticed he matched the description of a robbery suspect due to his 
“wide-set nose.”172 Castile’s girlfriend Diamond Reynolds was in the 
passenger seat along with her four-year-old daughter in the backseat.173 
After Yanez and another officer, Joseph Kauser, pulled Castile’s 
vehicle over, Yanez approached Castile’s driver-side window, told him 
that he had a broken taillight, and asked for his driver’s license and 
proof of insurance.174 Kauser stood on the passenger side of the 
 
 166. Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, supra note 15, at 95. 
 167. Isabel Wilkerson, Mike Brown's Shooting and Jim Crow Lynchings Have 
Too Much in Common. It's Time for America to Own Up, GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2014, 
6:45 AM EDT), [https://perma.cc/X8S5-FSMX]; see also Tetlow, Discriminatory 
Acquittal, supra note 15, at 82–84. 
 168. Embrick, supra note 160, at 838–39 (referencing control over black and 
brown bodies in his article that compares Jim Crow to recent police killings). 
 169. This does not mean that racial character evidence could not be used 
against a police officer of color.  
 170. Crimesider Staff, Philando Castile Case Verdict: Jeronimo Yanez Not 
Guilty, CBS NEWS (June 16, 2017, 4:01 PM), 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180401234648/https://www.cbsnews.com/news/philan
do-castile-case-verdict-jeronimo-yanez/]. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Tim Nelson, Philando Castile Traffic Stop Shooting Footage Released, 
NPR (June 21, 2017, 5:00 AM ET), 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180401235224/https://www.npr.org/2017/06/21/53376
4381/philando-castile-traffic-stop-shooting-footage-released].  
 173. Jay Croft, Philando Castile Shooting: Dashcam Video Shows Rapid Event, 
CNN (June 21, 2017, 10:14 AM ET), [https://perma.cc/E6AB-DR7T]. 
 174. Id.; Nelson, supra note 172.  
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vehicle.175 As Castile had a license to carry firearms, he calmly told 
Yanez, “Sir, I have to tell you I do have a . . . firearm on me.”176 
Yanez replied, “Ok . . . [d]on’t reach for it then.”177 Castile calmly 
affirmed he was not pulling it out.178 Yanez then suddenly fired seven 
bullets, five of which struck Castile.179 Castile’s last audible words 
were: “I wasn’t reaching . . . .”180 Yanez fatally shot Castile within 
forty seconds of approaching his vehicle.181 The shooting was captured 
on the police cruiser’s dash-cam, and Reynolds live-streamed the 
immediate aftermath of the shooting on Facebook where she repeatedly 
confirmed that Castile had just been reaching for his wallet to locate his 
license or identification as instructed.182 
Yanez was charged with second-degree manslaughter of Castile 
and two counts of dangerous discharge of a firearm without regard to 
the safety of Reynolds and her child.183 At trial, the primary issue in 
regards to the manslaughter charge was whether Officer Yanez was 
truly afraid for his life.184 The only admissible evidence put forth to 
prove Yanez was reasonably afraid for his life was his own testimony 
and an expert witness who testified that, from Yanez’s account, it was 
likely he had seen a gun since Yanez reported seeing Castile’s hand 
form into a C-shape.185 Yanez’s testimony was contradicted by Castile’s 
 
 175. Croft, supra note 173.  
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id.; Timeline of Key Events in Philando Castile Shooting, CBS MINN. 
(June 14, 2017, 12:22 PM), [https://perma.cc/F5E4-TEGL]. 
 183. Mark Berman, Minn. Officer Acquitted in Shooting of Philando Castile 




 184. See Martin Kaste, Cop Shooting Death Cases Raise Question: When is 
Fear Reasonable?, NPR (June 30, 2017, 10:37 AM ET), 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180402003642/https://www.npr.org/2017/06/30/53499
2121/cop-shooting-death-cases-raise-question-when-is-fear-reasonable]. 
 185. KARE Staff, Yanez Trial: How Things Unfolded, KARE 11 (June 13, 
2017, 11:29 AM CDT), [https://perma.cc/7CVS-HVC5]. 
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final words, Reynolds’s eyewitness testimony, and the dash-cam 
video.186 
It is likely Yanez lied on the stand that Castile had reached for his 
firearm. At trial, Yanez testified that he actually saw Castile’s gun.187 
Immediately after the shooting, however, Yanez admitted that he had 
not seen the firearm.188 As captured by the dash-cam video, within 
minutes of the shooting, Yanez was questioned by a responding officer 
and made statements clearly indicating that he had not seen the gun. 
Specifically, Yanez said “I don’t know where the gun was, he didn’t 
tell me where the fucking gun was, and then it was just getting hinky, 
he gave, he was just staring ahead, and then I was getting fucking 
nervous[.]”189 Similarly, the following day, when interviewed by the 
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA), Yanez never 
definitively stated that he saw a firearm.190 He did nothing more than to 
suggest the perceived presence of a firearm;191 yet when questioned in 
court nearly a year later, Yanez testified that he saw a firearm in 
Castile’s hand and thus was forced to shoot him.192 
Not only was Yanez’s testimony unreliable due to direct 
contradictions, but his testimony that Castile was pulling out a gun was 
contradicted by numerous pieces of additional evidence, including 
Castile’s own last words.193 The dash-cam video reveals that 
immediately before, during, and after the incident, Castile and 
Reynolds are describing the situation, particularly stating that Castile 
was not reaching for his firearm. Castile’s last audible words were “I 
wasn’t reaching . . . .”194 Further, Castile’s calm voice before the 
 
 186. See Susan Du, Interviews Contradict Jeronimo Yanez Trial Testimony He 
Saw Philando Castile’s Gun, CITY PAGES (June 20, 2017), [https://perma.cc/J8UN-
D5SK]; see also Croft, supra note 173.  
 187. KARE Staff, supra note 185. 
 188. Mark Berman, What the Police Officer Who Shot Philando Castile Said 
About the Shooting, WASH. POST (June 21, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/06/21/what-the-police-
officer-who-shot-philando-castile-said-about-the-shooting/?utm_term=.16455c5e48a0.  
 189. Du, supra note 186. 
 190. Id.; see also Interview with Jeronimo Yanez, Officer, Minn. Dep’t of 
Pub. Safety, Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (July 7, 2016), [https://perma.cc/S7W5-
LQNT]. 
 191. Interview with Jeronimo Yanez, supra note 190.  
 192. When Yanez told Castile not to reach for his weapon, Yanez testified that 
he “was able to see [Castile’s] right hand, it was in a C–shape. And he continued to 
pull out the firearm.” KARE Staff, supra note 185. 
 193. See supra note 186. 
 194. Croft, supra note 173. 
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shooting indicates that he was not reaching for a firearm.195 Reynolds’s 
eyewitness testimony was that he was not reaching for the gun but 
trying to unbuckle his seatbelt to retrieve his license as requested.196 
Castile’s firearm was still in his pocket when paramedics moved his 
body into the ambulance.197 Officer Kauser, who accompanied Yanez 
and was Yanez’s long-time friend, did not see Castile’s weapon and 
was surprised198 when Yanez began shooting.199 This testimony is 
consistent with Kauser’s physical reaction on the dash-cam video where 
Kauser did not appear to see a gun or react in any way that he 
perceived a dangerous situation and then was startled when Yanez 
began shooting.200 Additionally, the prosecution’s expert witness 
testified that there was “absolutely no reason to believe Mr. Castile was 
some kind of threat,”201 and that Yanez’s actions were “objectively 
unreasonable” that day.202 
Ultimately, the determination of whether Defendant Yanez was 
reasonably afraid for his safety came down to character. The jury had 
to determine who they believed. Did they believe Defendant Yanez 
when he claimed Castile attempted to pull a gun on him? Or did they 
believe Castile, whose literal last words denied reaching for his gun (an 
assertion which was supported by other pieces of evidence)? Did the 
 
 195. Sarah Horner, Witness Testimony from the Jeronimo Yanez Trial: A 
Summary, TWINCITIES PIONEER PRESS (July 5, 2017, 11:36 AM), 
[https://perma.cc/CA3X-F59C] (“Viewed through that lens, [an expert at trial] said a 
reasonable officer would not have viewed Castile as a threat, given that he politely 
disclosed to Yanez that he was carrying a firearm, was traveling with a woman and 
child in his car, and had no reason to believe he was being stopped for anything more 
than a broken taillight. ‘There (was) absolutely no reason to believe Mr. Castile was 
some kind of threat,’ [the expert] testified. ‘(Yanez was) stopping a motorist driving his 
family home from shopping. . . . (Castile was) cooperative. He hands over his 
insurance card. . . . He’s calm.’”). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Du, supra note 186. 
 198. When interviewed by the BCA, Kauser stated he was “absolutely” 
surprised when Yanez began shooting. Complaint Details Moments Surrounding 
Castile’s Fatal Shooting, CBS MINN. (Nov. 16, 2016, 1:43 PM), 
[https://perma.cc/6MTY-DFLL]. 
 199. Sarah Horner, Castile’s Girlfriend Testifies He Was Trying to Unbuckle 
Seat Belt When Shot, TWINCITIES PIONEER PRESS (June 7, 2017, 2:50 PM), 
[https://perma.cc/PY8S-9MTG]. 
 200. Croft, supra note 173 (hyperlink includes embedded link of dash-cam 
video). 
 201. Horner, supra note 195. 
 202. Chao Xiong, Expert: Jeronimo Yanez’s Actions in Killing Philando Castile 
Were ‘Objectively Unreasonable,’ STARTRIBUNE (June 8, 2017, 9:28 AM), 
[https://perma.cc/RN9Q-9VBM]. 
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jurors believe Yanez or did they believe Reynolds who during, 
immediately after, and at trial consistently maintained Castile was 
attempting to get his identification as instructed? In the end, it came 
down to whether the jury believed the black victim and black 
eyewitness or the non-black police officer. 
From an evidentiary standpoint, Castile’s and Reynolds’s 
statements during and following the incident were more trustworthy 
than Yanez’s trial testimony. Not only were their statements less self-
serving, the evidentiary principles behind these types of present sense 
impressions and excited utterances deem them more reliable than 
Yanez’s inconsistent statement at trial nearly one year after the 
shooting. Present sense impressions are statements “describing or 
explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the 
declarant perceived it.”203 The theory behind this hearsay exception204 is 
that a “substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negate the 
likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.”205 In other 
words, the declarant would not have the opportunity to forget the event 
or fabricate the statement. When Castile and Reynolds made statements 
during and immediately after the shooting, there was no time to 
consider or contemplate a fabrication. 
Excited utterances are statements “relating to a startling event or 
condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement 
that it caused.”206 “The rationale of the excited utterance exception is 
that the stress of nervous excitement or physical shock stills the 
reflective faculties, thus removing an impediment to truthfulness.”207 
Clearly, Yanez’s firing of seven bullets into the vehicle at close range—
some which fatally wounded Castile and one which struck one to two 
inches from Reynolds, as well as one bullet which struck the back seat 
where Reynolds’s four-year-old sat in her car seat208—constitutes a 
startling event. Both Castile and Reynolds were unmistakably under the 
stress of that event when they made their statements that Castile was 
never reaching for his gun. 
 
 203. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).  
 204. The analysis here is not whether the statements qualified under a hearsay 
exception, but to apply evidence law principles to weigh the relative reliability of the 
conflicting statements. 
 205. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s note.  
 206. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).  
 207. United States v. DeMarce, 564 F.3d 989, 997 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotations omitted) (quoting Reed v. Thalacker, 198 F.3d 1058, 1061 (8th Cir. 1999)). 
 208. Associated Press, The Latest: Expert: No Reason to Think Motorist a 
Threat, WASH. TIMES (June 7, 2017),  [https://perma.cc/7EEE-SMKG]. 
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Further, under evidence law principles, Yanez’s own excited 
utterances to a responding officer (who was sent to interview him) that 
he did not know where Castile’s firearm was before firing his own gun 
are particularly reliable. These statements are captured on the dash-cam 
video where Yanez is unambiguously in an agitated state and can be 
heard yelling, crying, and using frequent offensive expletives.209 From 
an evidentiary standpoint, these statements are more trustworthy than 
Yanez’s inconsistent testimony nearly a year later that he clearly saw 
Castile’s firearm. 
In determining whether to believe the black victim and black 
witness or the non-black police officer, the jury chose the latter. There 
was no indication that Philando Castile was violent, aggressive, or 
likely to pull a gun on a police officer—except his blackness. There was 
little to make Diamond Reynolds’s testimony not credible—except her 
blackness. Despite the fact that both Yanez’s and Reynolds’s recorded 
statements during and after the shooting indicate Yanez did not see a 
gun and that deadly force was unreasonable,210 jurors believed the 
officer over Diamond Reynolds.211 They believed Yanez even though 
his testimony was impeached by his own recounting of the events both 
at the scene and the next day. Despite this evidence in the record, the 
jurors found Yanez more credible than Reynolds and Castile.212 This 
outcome left many baffled;213 however, it makes sense when one 
considers the role race plays in determinations of people’s character and 
credibility. 
C. Categorizing Racial Character Evidence 
Racial character evidence can be grouped into at least three 
categories: “inherent reliance,” “stereotype emphasis,” and “expert or 
lay opinion.” Like many classifications, there is overlap. However, it is 
useful to consider each type of racial character evidence individually 
 
 209. Croft, supra note 173. 
 210. See id.; Xiong, supra note 202.  
 211. See, e.g., Kent Erdahl, Yanez Juror: ‘State Didn’t Prove He Was 
Dishonest,’ KARE 11 (June 20, 2017, 6:00 PM CDT), [https://perma.cc/QS9J-E2L5] 
(“[A juror] says the jury largely struggled with Diamond Reynolds's credibility in court 
. . . .”). 
 212. Id. (quoting one juror who stated, “[t]he state didn't prove he was 
dishonest.”). 
 213. Croft, supra note 173. This CNN article includes an illustrative example: 
“In a commentary Saturday, CNN legal analyst Joey Jackson asked, ‘[h]ow did a jury 
not see what the rest of the world did? And why does, and how could, this continue to 
happen? Will there ever be accountability?’” Id. 
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since different types may warrant different evidentiary objections or 
remediation. The Peña-Rodriguez case provides examples of racial 
character evidence against defendants and witnesses, and the criminal 
proceedings which followed the killings of Trayvon Martin, Michael 
Brown, and Philando Castile demonstrate how racial character evidence 
against victims is employed in self-defense and deadly force cases. 
1. INHERENT RELIANCE 
Juror H.C.’s statement “I think he did it because he’s Mexican”214 
is an example of inherent reliance on racial character evidence made 
explicit. The juror observed that the defendant was Latino (here, a 
Mexican-born legal permanent resident of the United States),215 and on 
the basis of this racial observation, believed that the defendant was the 
type of person to commit sexual crimes against females. The inference 
from this racial character evidence is that because the defendant had a 
character propensity—due to his race—to commit sexual offenses 
against girls and women, it was therefore likely he committed such 
offenses against the female teenage victims on the evening in question. 
Oftentimes, jurors will not overtly proclaim such inherent reliance 
on race as a proxy for a person’s character because it is politically 
incorrect or socially unacceptable in many circles. Thus, it is likely that 
most inherent reliance on racial character evidence goes unspoken. 
However, it might be revealed through widely-understood coded 
language, such as referring to “immigrants,” “thugs,” or “those 
people”216 to reference certain racialized populations, designate them as 
“other,” and allude to moral and behavioral characteristics 
stereotypically associated with the group. “Illegal,” “illegal 
immigrants,” or simply “immigrants” are “racially discriminatory 
codes for Hispanics.”217 It is widely understood that “thug” is a current 
 
 214. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017). 
 215. Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Top Court Backs Hispanic Man Over Juror’s 
Racist Comments, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2017, 10:34 AM), [https://perma.cc/Y4A4-
RH6L]. 
 216. See generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED 
RACIAL APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS (2014) 
(providing extensive analysis into coded language used to reference people of color and 
embrace racial stereotypes). 
 217. Kevin R. Johnson, The Keyes to the Nation’s Educational Future: The 
Latina/o Struggle for Educational Equity, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1231, 1239 (2013) 
(quoting Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1193 (M.D. Ala. 
2011)); see generally Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The 
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iteration of the “n-word.”218 “Through . . . code words it is possible to 
play on racial stereotypes, appeal to racial fears, and heap blame on 
blacks, other people of color, and immigrants without naming them.”219 
This is equally true in politics and the jury box. 
Similarly, racial “othering” and stereotyping can be achieved by 
and revealed through jurors simply referring to people of color as 
“they” and “those people.” For example, in the trial of a Hispanic man 
for a robbery, a juror used coded language to discuss racial character of 
Latinos stating, “I guess we’re profiling, but they cause all the 
trouble.”220 Another example is the manner in which a white, female 
juror in the trial of George Zimmerman repeatedly referred to the black 
victim Trayvon Martin and the prosecution’s black witness Rachel 
Jeantel as “they,” but defendant Zimmerman as “George.”221 She spoke 
about “the type of life that they [live],” and “how they’re living, in the 
environment that they’re living in.”222 At trial, the defense had 
introduced evidence of robberies in Zimmerman’s apartment complex 
that had been allegedly perpetrated by black males.223 The same juror 
commented that “George Zimmerman is a man whose heart was in the 
right place, but just got displaced by the vandalism in the neighborhood 
and wanting to catch these people so badly he went above and beyond 
what he should have done.”224 Again, she apparently used “these 
people” to reference blacks, specifically suspected black burglars. 
Despite occasional disclosures of racially coded language, inherent 
reliance on racial character evidence is particularly insidious because it 
is both difficult to detect and widespread. Since the racial character 
evidence is “submitted” to the jury passively or disseminated by jurors 
 
Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263 
(1997). 
 218. Calvin John Smiley & David Fakunle, From “Brute” to “Thug:” The 
Demonization and Criminalization of Unarmed Black Male Victims in America, 26 J. 
HUM. BEHAV. SOC. ENV. 350, 350–51 (2016). 
 219. STEPHEN STEINBERG, TURNING BACK: THE RETREAT FROM RACIAL JUSTICE 
IN AMERICAN THOUGHT AND POLICY 214 (2001). 
 220. United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 78 (1st Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).  
 221. Carodine, supra note 2, at 688–89; Dan Zak, Who is Juror B37? Our Sole 




 222. Id. 
 223. Id.; Thompson, supra note 12, at 342. 
 224. Mark Mooney, George Zimmerman Juror Says His ‘Heart Was in the 
Right Place,’ ABC NEWS (July 15, 2013), [https://perma.cc/W255-UAKA] (emphasis 
added). 
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behind the closed doors of the deliberation room, opposing counsel 
cannot object. Furthermore, studies have uncovered that most 
Americans harbor racial bias against people of color.225 Thus it is likely 
that this racial bias is frequently relied upon when a defendant, victim, 
or witness is a person of color. 
Inherent reliance on racial character evidence is simply the way 
implicit racial bias takes on evidentiary value. Implicit racial bias often 
causes jurors to determine that a defendant or victim is prone to 
violence or criminality simply by perceiving his or her race.226 
Similarly, the credibility of witnesses and parties is often based on 
observations of race. For instance, in Peña-Rodriguez, Juror H.C. 
stated he “did not find petitioner’s alibi witness was credible because, 
among other things, the witness was ‘an illegal.’”227 The alibi witness 
was a legal permanent resident of the United States,228 but this juror 
relied on a pervasive racial stereotype that Latinos, especially those of 
Mexican origin or descent, are not lawfully present229 and therefore not 
honest or trustworthy. “[J]ury trials are all about character,” and a 
central function of juries is to make character judgments.230 Juries use 
 
 225. See, e.g., CHERYL STAATS, KIRWAN INST., STATE OF THE SCIENCE: 
IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 2014 19, 72 (2014), [https://perma.cc/D597-NLVB] (“Extensive 
research has uncovered a pro-White/anti-Black bias in most Americans, regardless of 
their own racial group. Moreover, researchers have even documented this bias in 
children, including those as young as six years old.”); see generally MAHZARIN R. 
BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 
(2016). 
 226. See Thompson, supra note 12, at 329–30. According to Thompson: 
Data collected from the Race IAT [Implicit Association Test] indicate that 
approximately 88 percent of White Americans harbor some level of implicit 
bias against African-Americans. Interestingly, the data also indicate that 48 
percent of African-Americans show a bias in favor of White Americans. 
While these statistics are startling, they should not be read to suggest that 
88 percent of Whites and 48 percent of Blacks hold racist attitudes toward 
African-Americans; however, several scientific studies have found that IAT 
results are at least a moderate predictor of behavior. Thus, in some 
instances, individuals who hold implicit biases against African-Americans 
may act upon those biases when engaging in decision-making . . . .  
Id. 
 227. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017). 
 228. Id.  
 229. The stereotype that Latinos are unlawfully present in the United States is 
both common and unfounded. See Angela M. Banks, The Curious Relationship Between 
“Self-Deportation” Policies and Naturalization Rates, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
1149, 1192 (2012).  
 230. Josephine Ross, “He Looks Guilty”: Reforming Good Character Evidence 
to Undercut the Presumption of Guilt, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 229 (2004). 
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shortcuts to determine the credibility of witnesses, and these shortcuts 
include factors based on racial biases.231 
2. RACIAL STEREOTYPE EMPHASIS 
Racial character evidence can also be introduced more directly at 
grand jury or trial by attorneys who seek to persuade the jury that a 
racial minority’s character is consistent with racial stereotypes. This 
sort of character evidence is often utilized in cases where a defendant 
asserts self-defense or warranted use of force against a victim of color. 
Instead of restricting themselves to the facts of what occurred during 
the incident in question which allegedly led the defendant to reasonably 
fear for his or her safety or the safety of others, prosecutors (who 
begrudgingly pursue criminal charges) and defense counsel subtly try to 
show that the victim was stereotypically black or brown. 
a. Stereotypical Blackness 
A victim (or witness’s) blackness or brownness is emphasized by 
presenting “evidence” of the victim’s dress, appearance, interests, and 
activities that are perceived as consistent with racial stereotypes and in 
turn play on the jurors’ implicit biases.232 It would be unheard of for a 
young white female to be perceived as violent, aggressive, or otherwise 
threatening to law enforcement or the “neighborhood watch” for 
wearing a hoodie, listening to hip-hop music, playing basketball, 
experimenting with marijuana, or using popular slang on social media. 
The same is not true for a victim of color. A black victim’s mere 
interest or involvement in activities stereotypically associated with 
black people or culture can typify the victim as stereotypically black 
and possessing all the racialized characteristics associated with 
blackness, including being dangerous and threatening.233 
For instance, when George Zimmerman was prosecuted for killing 
black seventeen-year-old Trayvon Martin, defense counsel attempted to 
introduce photos of Trayvon wearing “urban”234 style clothing such as 
 
 231. Id. at 231. 
 232. See Thompson, supra note 12, at 322. 
 233. See Lacy, supra note 116, at 564. 
 234. It should be noted that “urban” attire is often a racialized code word 
referring to clothing stereotypically associated with African Americans although such 
clothing is commonly worn by people of all races. See generally, Kimberly A. 
Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An Argument About 
Assimilation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 365, 413–14 (2006).  
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baggy pants and hooded sweatshirts, smoking what was assumed to be 
marijuana, wearing a “grill” of removable gold teeth, and “flipping 
off” the camera bare-chested or in a white tank top displaying tattoos.235 
They also acquired photos from his social media account of a marijuana 
plant, and of a gun in the hand of an unidentified black person.236 The 
defense also sought to introduce evidence that Trayvon had been 
suspended from school for marijuana paraphernalia, received bad 
grades, and got into fights at school, as well as text messages where he 
referenced guns, fights, marijuana, and used certain slang lingo.237 
These photos, school records, and texts were primarily relevant to 
showing that Trayvon was a stereotypical black youth, and thus should 
be presumed to have been a threat to Zimmerman. Although much of 
this evidence was excluded pretrial in this case,238 it still serves as 
examples of the type of racial character evidence that might be 
introduced at trials without appropriate objection. 
Racial character evidence can also be raised at trial by the manner 
in which counsel questions a witness and signals to the jury that the 
witness is a stereotypical racial minority, and hence not credible. This 
occurred in the Zimmerman trial when the prosecution’s key witness, 
Rachel Jeantel—a black friend who had been speaking to Trayvon while 
Zimmerman followed him—was cross-examined.239 As scholars have 
observed, Zimmerman’s counsel employed cross-examination tactics to 
show that she was “less educated and less articulate,” and accordingly 
“less believable than similarly situated white witnesses.”240 These 
tactics included a harsh tone, aggressive questioning techniques, 
requiring her to read out-loud when she had English literacy 
 
 235. See, e.g., Jonathon Capehart, Pictures Put Trayvon Martin on Trial, 
WASH. POST (May 28, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
partisan/wp/2013/05/28/pictures-put-trayvon-martin-on-
trial/?utm_term=.34f099228855; Michael Pearson & David Mattingly, Gun, Drug 
Texts Feature in New Trayvon Martin Shooting Evidence, CNN (May 26, 2013, 1:21 
PM), [https://perma.cc/NE44-7RU9]. 
 236. Pearson & Mattingly, supra note 235. 
 237. Id.; Casey Glynn, George Zimmerman Lawyers Seek Trayvon Martin’s 
School Records, Social Media Accounts, CBS NEWS (Oct. 19, 2012, 11:28 AM), 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180402025248/https://www.cbsnews.com/news/george
-zimmerman-lawyers-seek-trayvon-martins-school-records-social-media-accounts/]. 
 238. Josh Levs, Graham Winch & Victim Blackwell, Marijuana, Fights, Guns: 
Zimmerman Loses Key Pretrial Battles, CNN (May 29, 2013, 6:40 AM), 
[https://perma.cc/EG2K-W6U9]. 
 239. Tina Susman, A Tense Cross-Examination in George Zimmerman Trial, 
L.A. TIMES (June 27, 2013), [https://perma.cc/KSV6-L2P5]. 
 240. Carodine, supra note 2, at 687. 
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difficulties, and repeating back her testimony as if he was providing 
verbal captioning to highlight the differences in her speech in 
comparison to his as a white, middle-aged, highly-educated male.241 
The attorney’s tone and questions implied not merely that Jeantel was 
mistaken or biased, but that she was “unintelligent and thus not 
credible.”242 Jeantel is a multilingual immigrant whose first language is 
not English.243 Instead of casting her in the light of a multilingual, 
English language learner, she was portrayed as “ignorant, ‘stupid,’ and 
a liar,”244 playing into a racist stereotype of black girls.245 “The 
message that Zimmerman’s lawyer sent the jury was that she looked 
and sounded different and so must be lying because she was not ‘one of 
us.’”246 
The racializing effect of Zimmerman’s attorney’s cross-
examination of Jeantel is not speculative. “Jeantel was almost 
immediately attacked on social media for her appearance, speech, and 
perceived level of intelligence,”247 and criticized as “stereotypically 
black” by whites and blacks alike.248 “Social media was set ablaze with 
criticism of Jeantel for being stereotypically Black—uneducated, 
hostile, inarticulate, angry toward Whites, lazy, and a thug—and it is 
possible that the jurors made similar assessments about Martin’s 
character.”249 In a post-trial interview with a Zimmerman juror, the 
juror reported that she felt Jeantel was not credible due to her lack of 
education and communication skills and condescendingly stated she felt 
pity for Jeantel and perceived Jeantel to be embarrassed by her 
educational and communication shortcomings.250 This reveals how 
 
 241. See id. at 688–89. 
 242. Id. at 688.  
 243. See Grace Sullivan, In Your Own Words: Investigating Voice, 
Intertextuality, and Credibility of Rachel Jeantel in the George Zimmerman Trial, 1 
PROC. LINGUISTIC SOC’Y AM. 13:6 (2016).  
 244. Carodine, supra note 2, at 689. 
 245. MONIQUE W. MORRIS, PUSHOUT: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF BLACK GIRLS 
IN SCHOOLS 43 (2016) (discussing widely accepted stereotypes of black females “as less 
intelligent, hypersexual, loud, sassy, ‘ghetto,’ or domestic”). 
 246. Carodine, supra note 2, at 688 (quoting Kristin A. Randall, The George 
Zimmerman Trial: Witness Rachel Jeantel, MENTAL HEALTH & CRIM. JUST. (July 1, 
2013), [https://perma.cc/WRJ5-2TH8]). 
 247. Thompson, supra note 12, at 337.  
 248. Id. at 337–38. See also Jelani Cobb, Rachel Jeantel on Trial, NEW 
YORKER (June 27, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/rachel-jeantel-
on-trial. 
 249. Thompson, supra note 12, at 338.  
 250. Id. at 340–41. 
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“Jeantel’s failure to present herself in accordance with White-specific 
[not to mention native English-speaker] norms very likely influenced 
[the jurors’] assessment of the characters of both Jeantel and Martin.”251 
b. The “Black Brute” or “Thug” Stereotype 
In self-defense and deadly use of force cases, one of the most 
harmful uses of racial character evidence is emphasis of the centuries-
old stereotype of African American victims as black “brutes” or 
“thugs.” Stereotypes of blacks as larger, stronger, and more dangerous 
than other races serve to justify their killing as reasonable. The racist 
black “brute,” “beast,” “fiend,” or “demon” stereotype has a long 
history in the United States.252 This stereotype has been proliferated 
through literature, journalism, and the law from the time of slavery to 
the present.253 “The brute caricature portrays Black men as innately 
savage, animalistic, destructive, and criminal—deserving punishment, 
maybe death.”254 The purpose of this characterization is “to invoke fear 
on the part of the White audience, and to justify repressive measures 
towards Black Americans.”255 This stereotype has resulted in a 
persistent fear of black criminality which has manifested as white flight 
and the characterization of black youth as “super-predators.”256 
Although facially race-neutral, the term “super-predator” has been 
identified as racist,257 but new terms such as “thug” have emerged in its 
place. “Thug” is modern terminology for “black brute.”258 
“The ‘black brute’ stereotype may be one of the most enduring in 
this nation’s history and persists even today.”259 However, most people, 
 
 251. Id. at 339.  
 252. See generally Marion L. Dawson, The South and the Negro, 172 N. AM. 
REV. 279 (1901). 
 253. Ryan P. Alford, Appellate Review of Racist Summations: Redeeming the 
Promise of Searching Analysis, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 325, 345 (2006). 
 254. Id.  
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 346. 
 257. Michael E. Jennings, Trayvon Martin and the Myth of Superpredator: A 
Note on African American Males as Problems in American Society, in TRAYVON 
MARTIN, RACE, AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 191, 193 (Kenneth J. Fsaching-Varner et al. 
eds., 2014) (“The animal imagery summoned by the superpredator label, however, had 
strong racial overtones that linked African American males to a predatory culture 
lacking in moral character and committed to violent consumption.” (citing MARC 
MAURER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (2006))). 
 258. See Smiley & Fakunle, supra note 218, at 350–51, 354. 
 259. Alford, supra note 253, at 346 (“[N]ot only is the stereotype of the Black 
brute current within American society, but that in all its iterations, including those that 
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including jurors, are unaware of their reliance on this stereotype in 
assessing black victims. Whites perceive black men as bigger, taller, 
heavier, stronger, and more dangerous than similarly-sized white 
men.260 In fact, whites are more likely to go as far as to attribute 
superhuman abilities, including strength and endurance, to blacks than 
other racial groups.261 
Implicit bias against blacks is accompanied by implicit bias in 
favor of whites. The pervasiveness of the black brute, black-as-
dangerous-criminal and preference for whites as innocent and virtuous 
has been proven through many studies. For instance, Implicit 
Association Tests (IATs) show that nearly seventy-five percent of test 
takers demonstrate implicit bias in favor of whites and against blacks.262 
Further, test participants are more likely to associate blackness with 
guilt in comparison to whiteness to the point “‘that the [Guilty/Not 
Guilty] IAT scores predicted participants’ evidence judgments.’”263 
More specifically, numerous studies have found that “individuals are 
quicker to identify weapons and slower to recognize harmless objects, 
like tools, in the hands of Black persons than in the hands of White 
persons.”264 
Implicit racial bias265 both causes police officers to kill black 
people and jurors to later fail to indict or convict the police officers. 
 
serve to ‘racially construct’ Latino and other minority youth, it has been proven to be 
one of the most enduring and powerful stereotypes in the nation's history.”).  
 260. A 2017 study published in the American Psychological Association’s 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology showed that white people perceived black 
men as more muscular, heavier, taller, stronger and more dangerous than white men 
the same size and weight. See Ben Guarino, People See Black Men as Larger and 




 261. J.C. Sevcik, Study Shows White People Think Black People Are 
Superhuman, Magical, UPI (Nov. 14, 2014, 8:27 PM), [https://perma.cc/KL4E-ASSZ] 
(discussing Adam Waytz, Kelly Marie Hoffman & Sophie Trawalter, A 
Superhumanization Bias in Whites’ Perceptions of Blacks, 6 SOC. PYSCH. & 
PERSONALITY SCI. 352 (2014)).  
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Since blackness itself signifies criminality and danger and whiteness 
represents virtue, as Blanche Cook has observed: “In the grip of 
implicit bias, the black body itself becomes evidence of the crime and 
danger, and the white body becomes evidence of innocence and 
righteousness.”266 Race itself is evidence that the victim of color was 
threatening and that the officer was justified in responding with deadly 
force. 
Police officers’ defense counsel and prosecutors who only 
reluctantly pursue charges against police introduce racial character 
evidence by relying on the black brute stereotype and coded appeals to 
rouse racial fear and discrimination by jurors who are 
disproportionately white. An example of this is the grand jury 
proceedings against white officer Darren Wilson who shot to death 
unarmed black eighteen-year-old Michael Brown in Ferguson, 
Missouri. 
At the grand jury proceedings, the prosecution acted more like 
“defense counsel,”267 and allowed Wilson to offer a fantastical story 
portraying Brown as a mystical black superhuman brute and demon 
without being subject to cross-examination.268 Specifically, Wilson 
testified that on August 9, 2014, while patrolling in his marked police 
SUV he noticed two young men, Brown and his friend Dorian Johnson, 
walking in the middle of the street.269 Wilson stopped his vehicle a 
couple of feet in front of them and asked why they did not use the 
sidewalk.270 Johnson said they were almost to their destination, and 
Brown responded with “vulgar language.”271 
Wilson then noticed a box of cigarillos in Brown’s hand and that 
Johnson was wearing a black shirt consistent with a recent report of a 
 
realizing it.” Id. at 1559 n.23 (citing Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the 
Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012)). 
 266. Cook, supra note 12, at 604, 611–12. 
 267. Id. at 570. 
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theft of a box of cigarillos from a convenience store.272 Wilson testified 
that he began to open his door and asked Brown to “come here for a 
minute.”273 Brown allegedly responded by swearing and slamming the 
door shut.274 According to Wilson, he then tried to open the door again 
while Brown stared at him as if “to overpower” him with an “intense 
face,” eventually slamming the door and physically attacking Wilson 
through the open SUV window with full swing punches while still 
holding the box of cigarillos.275 According to Wilson, Brown then 
handed the cigarillos to Johnson and continued to punch him through 
the vehicle’s window.276 Wilson explained that “when I grabbed him, 
the only way I can describe it is I felt like a five-year-old holding onto 
Hulk Hogan.”277 Wilson reported that he then drew his firearm 
threatening to shoot Brown if he did not stop.278 Wilson claims that 
Brown responded by saying “you are too much of a pussy to shoot 
me,” then grabbed at Wilson’s gun, and Wilson fired the gun.279 Wilson 
testified Brown then looked up at him and “had the most intense 
aggressive face. The only way I can describe it, it looks like a demon, 
that’s how angry he looked. He comes back towards me again with his 
hands up.”280 
Wilson said he then fired a second time, and Brown struck him 
again through the window, and then ran off.281 Wilson testified he 
pursued Brown and ordered him to get on the ground.282 Brown 
supposedly did not comply but instead he allegedly:  
[T]urn[ed], and when he looked at me, he made like a 
grunting, like aggravated sound and, he starts, he turns and 
he’s coming back towards me . . . he kind of does like a 
stutter step to start running. . . his left hand goes in a fist and 
 
 272. Id. at 202, 209. 
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 275. Id. at 209–11, 216. 
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goes to his side, his right one goes under his shirt in his 
waistband and he starts running at me.283  
Wilson testified he then fired a series of shots hitting Brown.284 
Wilson went on to say that Brown’s body jerked and, despite being 
shot, that he was “still coming at me, he hadn’t slowed down.”285 
Wilson then fired another round of shots, which struck Brown again.286 
Officer Wilson testified that:  
[A]t this point it looked like he was almost bulking up to run 
through the shots, like it was making him mad that I’m 
shooting at him. And the face that he had was looking straight 
through me, like I wasn’t even there, I wasn’t even anything 
in his way. Well he kept coming at me . . . .287  
Wilson shot at Brown twelve times leaving only one bullet remaining in 
his service revolver.288 
In his grand jury testimony, Wilson conveyed a story of a 
superhuman assailant who, despite being unarmed, repeatedly attacked 
a police officer with no provocation except having been asked to walk 
on the sidewalk and a guilty conscience of, at most, having reaching 
over a counter and taken a box of cigarillos.289 When the officer 
brandished his weapon and threatened to shoot, Brown allegedly 
responded with vulgar insults. Wilson described Brown’s expression as 
demonic, stating that it was “the most intense aggressive face.”290 
According to Wilson, Brown could resist bullets, which did not slow 
him down and only made him angrier, requiring a second round of 
shots to stop him. Like a possessed beast, Brown allegedly grunted, 
made aggravated sounds, bulked up, and charged forward undaunted by 
bullet wounds. Wilson’s description of Brown’s expressions, strength, 
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 285. Id.  
 286. Id.  
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and actions “feed into the stereotypical portrayal of the Black man as a 
brutish, animalistic character.”291 They served to provoke racial fear in 
the grand jurors so that they would find Wilson’s firing of a dozen 
rounds into an unarmed teenager reasonable. 
Instances of racial character evidence that relies on the black brute 
stereotype abound. Even younger black children are not immune to this 
dangerous stereotype. For example, in the grand jury proceedings 
concerning the police shooting of Tamir Rice, the twelve-year-old black 
child shot to death in Cleveland after someone had reported him playing 
with a gun that was later confirmed to be a toy, was described by 
prosecutors (who were tasked with bringing the white officers to justice 
for killing Tamir) as big, scary, and adult-like.292 A 2016 study found 
that faces of black children as young as five years old triggered 
thoughts of guns and violence.293 
Racialized code words and characterizations are racial character 
evidence employed to show that the victim was a black brute or demon 
that would terrify a reasonable police officer and deserved to be killed. 
“When such ‘code’ words trigger the implicit racial bias in jurors, it 
can become automatic to view the Black male as an animalistic brute 
with such great strength that deadly force was required in order to 
preserve the life of the officer.”294 Emphasis on racialized stereotypes, 
albeit veiled in code words, is a type of racial character evidence that 
can be relied upon by a jury in deciding not to indict or to acquit in 
police killing cases. 
3. EXPERT OR LAY OPINION 
Attorneys are not the only ones who submit racial character 
evidence to the jury; jurors can also take on that endeavor in the 
deliberation room. In Peña-Rodriguez, Juror H.C. actually presented 
“expert” opinion and lay opinion evidence about the racial character of 
“Mexicans” to his fellow jurors. In his lay opinion, he gave evidence 
 
 291. Kenneth Lawson, Police Shootings of Black Men and Implicit Racial Bias: 
Can’t We All Just Get Along, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 339, 371 (2015). 
 292. Daniel Marans, How a Prosecutor Managed to Blame a 12-Year-Old for 
Getting Killed by a Cop, HUFFPOST (Dec. 29, 2015), [https://perma.cc/YU5X-PTUU]. 
 293. Andrew R. Todd, Kelsey C. Thiem & Rebecca Neel, Does Seeing Faces 
of Young Black Boys Facilitate the Identification of Threatening Stimuli?, 27 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 384, 391 (2016). 
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that “Mexican men take whatever they want.”295 Specific to the 
criminal charges in the case, he stated that “Mexican men [are] 
physically controlling of women because they have a sense of 
entitlement and think they can ‘do whatever they want’ with women.”296 
He also gave expert opinion testimony in deliberations. Based upon his 
former law enforcement background, he said that he “believed that the 
defendant was guilty because in his experience as an ex-law 
enforcement officer, Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to 
believe they could do whatever they wanted with women.”297 He 
explained that “where he used to patrol, nine times out of ten Mexican 
men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls.”298 
Thus, in Peña-Rodriguez, a juror served as a pseudo lay and 
expert witness as to the racial character of men of Mexican origin. In 
his opinion, men of Mexican ancestry have a character propensity to be 
aggressive toward women and girls; possess a bravado and sense of 
entitlement; and have a tendency to take whatever they want from and 
do whatever they want to females. He further concluded that since the 
defendant was Mexican, he must have acted in accordance with a 
Mexican character propensity for sexual offenses against women and 
girls during the event in question, and accordingly was guilty of 
unlawful sexual contact and sexual harassment in the present case. This 
is a prime example of how character evidence can be submitted to the 
jury in the form of expert or lay opinion testimony. 
Jurors are not the only individuals who might serve as expert or 
lay opinion racial character witnesses. Sometimes actual witnesses—
whether expert or lay—in the trial will testify as to racial character 
evidence. An example is Dr. Walter Quijano, a psychologist in Texas 
who, for twenty years, “used defendants’ race as a factor in 
determining whether [blacks and Hispanics] are likely to commit crimes 
in the future.”299 He based this conclusion on prison statistics that racial 
minorities are disproportionately incarcerated in comparison to the 
general population.300 Dr. Quijano testified at numerous trials that black 
 
 295. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 350 P.3d 287, 289 (Colo. 2015), rev’d, 137 
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and brown people are more prone to violence than people of other 
races.301 
In one such case, Duane Buck had been convicted of capital 
murder and faced the death penalty.302 State court juries in Texas can 
only impose a death sentence if they unanimously agree beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a defendant is likely to commit future violence 
that constitutes a threat to society.303 Buck’s attorney called Dr. 
Quijano, who had been appointed by the trial judge to conduct a 
psychological evaluation of the defendant, to testify as an expert 
witness about the likelihood of Buck’s future violence.304 Although Dr. 
Quijano ultimately testified Buck was not likely to be dangerous in the 
future, he testified “that one of the factors pertinent in assessing a 
person’s propensity for violence was his race, and that Buck was 
statistically more likely to act violently because he is black.”305 Buck 
was sentenced to death by the jury.306 In a prior case, Dr. Quijano, had 
testified that a defendant’s Hispanic heritage “was a factor weighing in 
favor of future dangerousness.”307 These are unambiguous examples of 
expert witness racial character evidence. Race itself is used as proof of 
a person’s propensity to be dangerous or violent. Such expert witness 
testimony about racial character evidence is impermissible and 
oftentimes unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court of the United States recently issued an opinion 
in Buck v. Davis.308 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts 
rejected this expert opinion testimony of racial character evidence.309 
The Court observed that, according to Dr. Quijano, Buck’s “immutable 
characteristic [of race] carried with it an ‘increased probability’ of 
future violence.”310 The Court found that “[i]t would be patently 
 
 301. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 770 (2017). It should be noted that Dr. 
Quijano was not simply articulating a personal perspective, rather he was adopting the 
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unconstitutional for a state to argue that a defendant is liable to be a 
future danger because of his race.”311 This reasoning should apply to 
bar the use of race as character evidence of propensity for violence 
against victims in police killing cases. 
It should be noted that similar to jurors and experts, lay witnesses 
could also potentially provide opinion evidence of racial character. This 
could materialize, for instance, as a generalization that people from 
certain black or Latino neighborhoods are known for a culture of 
violence, drug distribution, or gang membership. It could also manifest 
as generalizations about what particular American Indian tribe 
members, groups of Asian Americans, or immigrants act like or what 
activities they engage in. 
III. RACIAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE: A CIVIL RIGHTS PROBLEM 
Juror reliance on racial character evidence in police killing cases is 
both a racial justice and an evidence law problem requiring 
constitutional and evidence law analysis and responses. Existing case 
law addressing jurors’ consideration of racial character evidence—
namely, Peña-Rodriguez—fails to address the scenario in which racial 
character evidence is considered against a victim of color to support a 
no true bill312 or acquittal. A persuasive argument can be made that 
discriminatory acquittals based on racial character evidence violate 
victims’ constitutional right of equal protection. However, because of 
the fact that the competing constitutional prohibition against double 
jeopardy, coupled with juror immunity, forecloses post-acquittal 
remedies, pre-verdict evidence solutions are particularly needed. 
A. Constitutionality of Racial Character Evidence Against Victims 
1. THE PROMISE AND LIMITATIONS OF PEÑA-RODRIGUEZ V. COLORADO 
Writing for the Court in Peña-Rodriguez, Justice Kennedy 
discussed two types of historical juror racial bias: discriminatory 
convictions of blacks and discriminatory acquittals of whites.313 The 
Court denounced the pervasive practice where “[a]ll-white juries 
 
 311. Id. at 775. 
 312. A no true bill is the grand jury’s finding that there is no probable cause to 
support formal criminal charges against a potential defendant. Andrew D. Leipold, Why 
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punished black defendants particularly harshly, while simultaneously 
refusing to punish violence by whites, including Ku Klux Klan 
members, against blacks . . . .”314 The Court pointed to a poignant 
example from post-Civil War Texas: Between 1865 and 1866, five 
hundred prosecutions of white defendants who had been charged with 
killing blacks were presented to all-white juries, and every single white 
defendant was acquitted.315 In response to this dramatic example of 
discriminatory acquittals, the Court concluded that “[t]he stark and 
unapologetic nature of race-motivated outcomes challenged the 
American belief that ‘the jury was a bulwark of liberty.’”316 
Although the Peña-Rodriguez Court denounced the racial bias 
against black victims that privileges non-black defendants and results in 
discriminatory acquittals, the Court’s remedy does not address this type 
of juror bias. The Court found that a juror’s racial bias against the 
defendant and his alibi witness deprived the defendant of an impartial 
jury as required by the Sixth Amendment.317 Colorado Rule of Evidence 
606(b), which is very similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 
prevents jurors from impeaching their verdict.318 Federal Rule of 
Evidence 606(b) and its state equivalents, known as juror no-
impeachment rules, provide that jurors: 
 [M]ay not testify about any statement made or incident that 
occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything 
on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental 
processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may 
not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s 
statement on these matters.319 
 
A minority of jurisdictions have allowed a racial bias exception to 
Rule 606(b), but most have not.320 Peña-Rodriguez changed this. The 
Court held that: 
 [W]here a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or 
she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a 
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 318. Id. at 877–78. 
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criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-
impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court 
to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any 
resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.321  
Thus, evidence of juror testimony and affidavits at the trial level 
asserting that Juror H.C. had stated that defendant Peña-Rodriguez was 
guilty of sexual offenses because he was Mexican and that his Latino 
alibi witness (who was a legal permanent resident) was not credible 
because he was an “illegal,” among other anti-Latino comments, were 
admissible evidence.322 This evidence is admissible despite Rule 
606(b)’s bar because the statements were “egregious” and 
“unmistakable in their reliance on racial bias,” thereby violating the 
Constitution.323 As a result, jurors can now testify about blatant racial 
bias of their fellow jurors during deliberations after a verdict of guilty 
has been entered. 
However, jurors are still barred from testifying about such racial 
bias when the defendant is acquitted for two reasons: (1) Peña-
Rodriguez addresses only convictions, and (2) there is a lack of feasible 
post-verdict remedies. The racial bias exception to juror no-
impeachment rules, articulated in Peña-Rodriguez, is based upon the 
Sixth Amendment impartiality clause.324 The Sixth Amendment 
guarantees criminal defendants (“the accused”) the right to an impartial 
jury325 but does not protect the rights of victims. Thus, Peña-Rodriguez 
does not directly apply to cases where juries discriminatorily acquit 
police officers for the killing of people of color. 
However, Peña-Rodriguez does provide precedential support for 
juridical recognition that juror racial bias against victims violates equal 
protection and that no-impeachment evidence rules should thus be made 
to yield to the equal protection components of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The Peña-Rodriguez Court discussed how racial 
discrimination by jurors, which resulted in white defendants being 
acquitted for the killing of blacks, was a type of “racial discrimination 
in the jury system [which] posed a particular threat both to the promise 
of the [Fourteenth] Amendment and to the integrity of the jury trial.”326 
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The constitutional right of equal protection exists, among other 
reasons, to protect victims of crime from racial discrimination in the 
criminal justice system. As Randall Kennedy has observed: 
A core purpose of the 1866 Equal Protection Clause was to 
affirm the rights of black victims of crime; the central idea 
was not merely to prevent the states from treating black 
criminal suspects, defendants, and convicts worse than white 
ones, but also (and perhaps even more emphatically) to 
guarantee that black victims of crime receive the same 
protection as white victims. Of course, things didn’t quite 
work out that way, and for the next hundred years, white-
dominated police forces, grand juries, and petit juries often 
contrived to look the other way when blacks were victimized 
by crime—especially in the South, where racist whites 
terrorized blacks in a regime marked by lynchings and nooses 
and burning crosses.327 
Moreover, Tania Tetlow has persuasively argued that 
discriminatory acquittals violate the Equal Protection Clause.328 “A jury 
may not constitutionally acquit based on discrimination against the 
victims of the crime any more than that jury could constitutionally 
convict a defendant based on discrimination.”329 Jurors serve as state 
actors when they render verdicts,330 and it is “one of the most basic 
tenets of equal protection law that state actors may not discriminate 
based upon race or gender, particularly within criminal trials.”331 
When a jury acquits a police officer based upon racial 
discrimination against a victim, the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection under the law is violated.332 As the Supreme Court has 
explained, “[d]iscrimination on the basis of race, odious in all respects, 
is especially pernicious in the administration of justice.”333 Permitting 
juror racial bias “damages ‘both the fact and the perception’ of the 
jury’s role as ‘a vital check against the wrongful exercise of power by 
 
 327. Akhil Reed Amar, Book Review, Three Cheers (and Two Quibbles) for 
Professor Kennedy, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1256, 1261–62 (1998) (citing RANDALL 
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 41–62 (1997)). 
 328. Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, supra note 15.  
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the State.’”334 As the Supreme Court has recently cautioned, juror racial 
bias is “a familiar and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would 
risk systemic injury to the administration of justice.” Just as the Court’s 
recognition and effort to address juror racial bias against defendants 
were necessary “to ensure that our legal system remains capable of 
coming ever closer to the promise of equal treatment under the law that 
is so central to a functioning democracy,”335 it is also necessary to 
correct juror racial bias against victims, particularly victims of state 
violence. 
It is time that the courts explicitly recognize that racially 
discriminatory acquittals violate victims’ equal protection rights. 
However, even if this were to happen, a racial bias exception to the no-
impeachment evidence rules would not be an effective evidence law 
remedy due to the lack of available post-verdict remedies. Even if 
jurors are allowed to impeach their not-guilty verdict, and it is 
determined that juror racial bias against the victim (and possibly 
corresponding racial bias in favor of the defendant) led to a 
discriminatory acquittal, the defendant still cannot be retried due to the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides: “nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . 
. . .”336 The primary protection under this clause is prohibition against 
retrial for the same offense after an acquittal.337 Thus, a white police 
defendant who was acquitted on the basis that jurors were racially 
biased against the victim could not be retried. 
In addition to the limitation of criminal post-verdict remedies, 
under the current system, there cannot be any civil rights action against 
jurors for a violation of the victim’s equal protection rights because 
jurors have absolute immunity for acts performed within the scope of 
their official duties.338 
The Peña-Rodriguez decision was a positive step forward in 
addressing juror racial bias—specifically, juror reliance on racial 
character evidence—which results in discriminatory convictions. 
However, the Court did not address discriminatory acquittals. In other 
words, the opinion does not address the modern version of mid-
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nineteenth century juror bias in favor of white defendants who killed 
blacks. Today’s crisis of unaccountability for police killings of people 
of color is the contemporary version of racially discriminatory 
acquittals, and a particularly concerning one given that the defendants 
are state actors. Therefore, despite Peña-Rodriguez, juror racial bias 
remains a serious problem that needs to be addressed. Specifically, 
since most post-acquittal remedies are foreclosed, pre-verdict evidence 
law solutions are required. 
IV. EVIDENCE LAW SOLUTIONS TO RACIAL CHARACTER 
EVIDENCE 
The crisis of police killings of people of color in the United States 
is a complex problem that requires a multitude of remedial approaches. 
This Article looks at the problem from only one subfield—that of 
evidence law—and hence proposes evidence law solutions. At first 
glance, this prescriptive response might appear limited to the trial stage 
of prosecution, since evidence rules and doctrines primarily govern the 
admissibility of evidence at trial. Evidence law solutions could affect all 
stages of a prosecution, however, including the initial decision to 
pursue charges. 
Prosecutors may choose not to zealously prosecute police officers 
who kill community members of color for a variety reasons, such as a 
reluctance to prosecute law enforcement officers with whom they 
work,339 due to public opinion,340 or because they do not think they will 
be able to prove the suspect is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
latter determination is based, in large part, on the availability and 
strength of evidence. The circumscription of attorneys’ use of and fact-
finders’ reliance on racial character evidence will affect the availability 
and strength of sources of proof. If, for instance, attorneys, jurors, and 
judges are discouraged from using or relying on a victim’s blackness to 
prove the victim posed a threat to the officer a guilty verdict might 
become more attainable. 
This Part first looks at the need for critical race evidence education 
to enable attorneys and judges to recognize racial character evidence. It 
pauses to consider the unique obstacles to confronting racial character 
evidence at the grand jury stage before outlining evidentiary objections 
 
 339. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Grand Jury’s Role in the Prosecution of 
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397, 416–17 (2017). 
 340. Id. at 409–10. 
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to racial character evidence. This includes objections on the grounds of 
improper character evidence, relevance, unfair prejudice, and 
inappropriate expert witness and lay opinion testimony. This Part also 
advocates for permissive use of rebuttal evidence of victims’ good 
character and the use of jury instructions addressing implicit bias and 
racial character evidence. 
A. Need for Critical Race Evidence Education 
Irrespective of the form that racial character evidence takes, it is 
always impermissible. Attorneys’ use and jurors’ reliance on racial 
character evidence usually go unnoticed, however, since most attorneys 
and judges are unaware of its existence and how it violates 
constitutional and evidence law. Awareness of the existence, effect, and 
unlawful nature of racial character evidence is necessary to ensure that 
proper evidentiary objections are asserted, rebuttal evidence of victims’ 
good character is introduced, and the jury is properly instructed to 
disregard racial character evidence. 
The first step to addressing racial character evidence is being able 
to recognize it and explain how it relates to racial bias. This is no easy 
task. Most often, racial character evidence is transmitted subtly, relied 
upon implicitly, or even generated in the secrecy of jury deliberations. 
Attorneys’ use of stereotype emphasis or expert (or lay) opinion 
testimony on racial character are the most straightforward, but they still 
require a sophisticated understanding of how racialization and racism 
operate in contemporary society. Training on and study of critical race 
theory (CRT) and its application to evidence law and practice is useful 
to identifying and understanding the impact of racial character evidence 
in all of its expressions.341 
In applying CRT to evidence law, we must answer a two-part 
“subordination question”: “(1) whether a rule of law or legal 
doctrine, practice, or custom [of evidence] subordinates 
important interests and concerns of racial minorities and (2) if 
so, how is this problem best remedied?” Derrick Bell’s 
theories of the pervasiveness and permanence of racism 
prompt us to be inquisitive. Even if a rule of evidence appears 
race-neutral on its face or in its application, we scrutinize it. 
CRT asserts that our justice system serves to protect and 
 
 341. For a comprehensive discussion on the application of critical race theory 
to evidence law, see Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2248–60.  
GONZALES ROSE – CAMERA READY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/2018  11:15 AM 
2018:369 Racial Character Evidence 423 
 
preserve existing power structures that ensure “insiders” 
remain in power and benefit from the subordination of 
“outsiders.” We can test this hypothesis in the realm of 
evidence by asking: Are racial “insiders,” such as whites, 
privileged under our evidentiary system? Specifically, does 
our system favor evidence proffered by whites or evidence 
infused with racism—both of which ultimately benefit white 
people as a group? Does it disfavor evidence introduced by 
people of color or evidence that attempts to bring embedded 
racism to light?342 
Law school courses and continuing legal education seminars on 
CRT generally, as well as the application of CRT to evidence law more 
specifically, train attorneys to identify and object to racism.343 They 
could also assist judges to decrease their own implicit biases and 
become more impartial and fair in their evidentiary rulings.344 
Education on techniques of critical race evidentiary analysis can help us 
understand how racial stereotypes and biases are presented as or 
assumed to be evidence at trial. Once an attorney can recognize racial 
character evidence, he or she can object to it and encourage the court to 
mitigate its effects. 
B. Confronting Racial Character Evidence in Grand Juries 
Before getting into evidentiary objections, rebuttal evidence, and 
jury instructions that can be made to limit the use racial character 
evidence at trial, we should pause to consider racial character evidence 
in grand jury proceedings. As discussed above, reliance on racial 
character evidence of victims of color as dangerous, threatening, and 
criminally-inclined can lead to grand juries failing to indict the police 
officers who killed them. Juror reliance on racial character evidence is 
particularly difficult to address at the grand jury stage, however, 
because the proceedings are conducted in secrecy345 with only minimal 
court supervision.346 Further, the rules of evidence generally do not 
apply to grand jury proceedings.347 Thus, there is no judge to prevent 
 
 342. Id. at 2260. 
 343. Id. at 2303. 
 344. Id.  
 345. 1 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 106 (4th ed. 2008); FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 
6(e); Richard M. Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REV. 455, 459 (1965). 
 346. See 2 MOD. CONST. L. § 27:9 (3d ed. 2011). 
 347. See McKethan v. United States, 439 U.S. 936, 938 (1978). 
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the submission of racial character evidence or opportunity for 
evidentiary objections to be made to such evidence, even when racial 
bias against the victim might violate the victim’s equal protection 
rights. 
As we have seen in high-profile cases—such as those concerning 
the deaths of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Tamir Rice—some 
prosecutors have used the grand jury process as a way to hold secret 
one-sided trials in favor of police officer defendants.348 Hence, it is 
critical that the problem of grand juror reliance on racial character 
evidence is dealt with. One possible approach would be to institute 
enhanced court supervision after the return of a no true bill. Courts 
could encourage grand jurors to come forward if they observed racial 
bias during the proceedings or deliberations. No-impeachment rules like 
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and state equivalents generally do not 
prevent jurors from testifying about racial bias in grand juror 
proceedings after a failure to indict because the rule only applies to 
impeachment of verdicts and indictments.349 Since there was no 
indictment, there is no Rule 606(b) bar. If the failure to indict was 
based upon racial bias, a second grand jury proceeding could be held. 
The prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply to grand jury 
proceedings.350 
However, this safeguard is unsatisfying for several reasons. First, 
it is unlikely that grand jurors would be able to detect all uses of racial 
character evidence or be motivated to report anything but the most 
blatant instances. Second, there is little reason to believe that a second 
grand jury proceeding would yield different results. Prosecutors have 
significant control over grand jury proceedings and can effectively 
determine whether the defendant is charged.351 Due to the close 
relationship between local law enforcement and local prosecutors, 
district attorneys are often reluctant to prosecute police officers.352 
Scholars, lawyers, and policy-makers have been critical of the use of 
 
 348. Ross, supra note 20, at 764. 
 349. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).  
 350. U.S. CONST. amend. V; United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 49 
(1992). 
 351. See Joshua Hegarty, Who Watches the Watchmen? How Prosecutors Fail 
to Protect Citizens from Police Violence, 37 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL'Y & 
PRAC. 305, 320–21 (2016).  
 352. Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001) (“[P]rosecutors often enjoy too close of a relationship 
with local police and are therefore reluctant to turn against those with whom they have 
worked.”). 
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grand juries in police misconduct and killing cases and have advocated 
for alternatives.353 Examples of these reforms include: use of special or 
independent prosecutors;354 federal prosecution either under federal law 
provisions or assignment of federal prosecutors to state-level 
prosecutions;355 direct citizen access to grand juries;356 appointment of a 
victim advocate in grand jury proceedings;357 judicial oversight of the 
grand jury;358 and additional procedural mechanisms to supplement the 
grand jury.359 
The problem of racial character evidence provides another basis 
for questioning current grand jury procedures in cases of police 
killings. In evaluating the advisability of reforms, the dangers posed by 
grand juror reliance on racial character evidence should be considered. 
There needs to be an opportunity to root out and address the use of 
racial character evidence against victims of color to prevent violations 
of their equal protection rights at the grand jury stage. 
C. Evidentiary Objections to Racial Character Evidence 
There are several evidentiary objections which should be 
considered when an opposing party introduces racial character evidence 
at trial. These objections include improper character evidence, lack of 
relevance, unfair prejudice, inadmissible expert opinion testimony, and 
impermissible lay opinion. As most state evidence rules are modeled 
after the Federal Rules of Evidence,360 these objections are discussed in 
the context of the federal rules. 
1. IMPROPER CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) sets forth a general character 
propensity ban that “[e]vidence of a person’s character or character 
 
 353. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Good and Bad Ways to Address Police Violence, 
48 URB. L. 675, 681–82 (2016). 
 354. Id. at 681 (citing FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST 
CENTURY POLICING 21 (2015)). 
 355. Id. at 681–82; Fairfax, Jr., supra note 339, at 416–17.  
 356. See Peter L. Davis, Rodney King and the Decriminalization of Police 
Brutality in America: Direct and Judicial Access to the Grand Jury as a Remedy for 
Victims of Police Brutality When the Prosecutor Declines to Prosecute, 53 MD. L. REV. 
271, 298 (1994). 
 357. Witmer-Rich, supra note 27. 
 358. Fairfax, Jr., supra note 339, at 412. 
 359. Id. 
 360. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 2–3 (3d ed. 2013). 
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trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person 
acted in accordance with the character or trait.”361 Further, Rule 404(b) 
provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not 
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a 
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 
character.”362 These rules mean that evidence of a defendant’s or 
victim’s character or prior bad acts cannot be used to prove that he or 
she committed a crime or acted a certain way during the incident in 
question. Just as a defendant’s or victim’s character or past acts cannot 
be used to prove that he or she was violent during the event in question, 
it is impermissible for race to be used as a proxy for character traits. 
Similarly, race should not be used as a proxy to determine whether a 
witness is honest or dishonest, credible or unbelievable on the stand. 
It is a well-settled principle in evidence law that character cannot 
be an issue in a criminal case “unless the defendant chooses to make it 
one.”363 Defendants make character an issue at trial by utilizing 
exceptions to Rule 404 which allow them to introduce evidence of their 
good character364 or a victim’s bad character, as long as the evidence is 
of a trait pertinent to the case.365 Defendants and their counsel are often 
hesitant to introduce character evidence about the defendant’s character 
because once he or she opens the door, the prosecutor can respond with 
evidence to rebut it.366 If a defendant offers evidence of a victim’s 
pertinent character trait, the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it 
and evidence of defendant’s same trait.367 For instance, if a defendant 
calls a character witness to testify that the victim had a reputation for 
being violent, the prosecutor could then call a character witness to 
testify that the victim had a peaceful character and that the defendant 
had a character for violence. 
The risks associated with introducing character evidence give a 
perverse incentive for defendants to introduce racial character evidence. 
Defendants may try to circumvent the character evidence rules and 
risks by introducing racial character evidence. For instance, a 
defendant police officer who has a history of violence in his 
 
 361. FED. R. EVID. 404(a). 
 362. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). 
 363. People v. Zachowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo, J.) 
(“Fundamental hitherto has been the rule that character is never an issue in a criminal 
prosecution unless the defendant chooses to make it one.”). 
 364. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A). 
 365. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(B). 
 366. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2)(A). 
 367. Id. 
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professional or personal life might be hesitant to call character 
witnesses to testify about his own character for nonviolence or the 
victim’s violent character since the prosecutor might rebut with a 
character witness attesting to the defendant’s violent reputation. If the 
victim is a person of color, however, the defendant could circumvent 
these rules by introducing evidence or asserting arguments that 
emphasize racial stereotypes about the victim, which provoke fact-
finders to make inferences about the victim’s violent character and 
violent action during the event. Further, even if a defendant is not 
afraid to open the door to character evidence, they might resort to 
racial character evidence because the victim was truly a peaceful 
person, and the defendant cannot secure a character witness to testify 
otherwise. 
Since most attorneys lack awareness of racial character evidence 
and its impact, opposing counsel typically fails to sufficiently object to 
racial character evidence. Further, since most judges are unfamiliar 
with the concept of race as character evidence, even when appropriate 
objections are made, the judge might be unpersuaded. It is imperative 
that attorneys and judges become educated on the role that racial 
character evidence plays in criminal prosecutions, especially police 
killing cases. 
2. LACK OF RELEVANCE 
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 and state equivalents, the 
evidence is relevant only if “it has any tendency to make a fact [of 
consequence] more or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.”368 Evidence that is not relevant is never admissible.369 
Evidence of a fact is relevant only “if the fact is of consequence in 
determining the action.”370 Whether a fact is of consequence depends on 
the substantive law governing the charge, defense, or other material 
issue in the case.371 Thus, in analyzing the relevance of racial character 
evidence in police killing cases, we must look to the applicable 
substantive law. 
 
 368. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 369. FED. R. EVID. 402. (“Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.”). 
 370. FED. R. EVID. 401(b). 
 371. FISHER, supra note 360, at 23.  
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The central issue in police deadly force cases is usually whether 
the officer’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable.372 It is 
implausible that (purported) evidence of a victim’s racial propensity to 
be threatening, aggressive, or violent—or evidence that emphasizes 
racial stereotypes to show such a propensity—could ever be a fact of 
consequence. The fact that a victim of color was a racial minority does 
not have any tendency to show that he or she was violent, aggressive, 
or threatening, or that the officer reasonably felt threatened by the 
victim. Even conservative Supreme Court justices, who are disinclined 
to recognize many manifestations of racism as unlawful, find the notion 
that race could be a factor in predicting propensity for violence 
abhorrent.373 Thus, it is likely a court, upon proper objection, would 
find direct racial character evidence, such as the likes of the expert 
testimony of Dr. Quijano, irrelevant. Moreover, the argument or 
inference that an officer was afraid of a person simply because he or 
she was a person of color and accordingly resorted to deadly force is 
redolent of blatant racism, not to mention unreasonable. 
Further, racial character evidence that emphasizes stereotypes to 
imply a victim’s racial propensity for being violent, aggressive, or 
otherwise threatening would likely not be relevant either. For instance, 
if the portions of Officer Darren Wilson’s grand jury testimony 
characterizing Michael Brown as a black brute or thug had occurred at 
trial, it should have been objected to and deemed inadmissible on the 
basis of relevance (as well as unfair prejudice, a discussion of which 
follows). Wilson’s subjective testimony equating himself to a “five-
year-old” in comparison to the strength of Brown who was like “Hulk 
Hogan”374 and a “grunting”375 “demon”376 was not relevant since the 
governing standard is not whether the officer was subjectively afraid of 
the victim, but whether the officer was reasonably afraid and whether 
the use of deadly force was reasonable.377 The governing standard is 
one of objective reasonableness, not subjective fear. Accordingly, while 
perceiving a victim to be of hulkish strength and looking demonic might 
support a subjective fear, it is not relevant to the reasonableness 
 
 372. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985); Graham v. Connor, 490 
U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
 373. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017); Buck v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 
1022, 1022 (2011) (denying certiorari while noting that the trial testimony was “bizarre 
and objectionable”). 
 374. Transcript of Grand Jury Volume V, supra note 270, at 212. 
 375. Id. at 227. 
 376. Id. at 225. 
 377. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 7–8; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. 
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inquiry. Prosecutors should be prepared and equipped to object to such 
subjective, race-laden testimony on relevance grounds. 
3. RISK OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE 
Even if a piece of racial character evidence that emphasizes 
negative racial stereotypes is found to be relevant under the low 
threshold of Rule 401, the evidence is likely of low probative value. 
Accordingly, this probative value can be substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and 
equivalent state rules378 provide that “[t]he court may exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger 
of . . . unfair prejudice[.]”379 As I have previously advocated,380 Rule 
403 and its state counterparts’ use of the term “prejudice” includes 
racial prejudice and seeking to provoke racial prejudice in the hearts 
and minds of fact-finders. 
When Officer Wilson described Michael Brown as superhuman in 
strength, like a demon, grunting and charging, and physically 
unaffected by multiple gunshot wounds, he was evoking a centuries-old 
racist stereotype about black men as threatening, animalistic, herculean 
brutes who are a threat to white lives. His black brute characterization 
of the teenager was an effort to incite racial fear in the minds of the 
predominately white381 grand jury. If such evidence was offered at trial, 
the prosecution should object that any probative value of such testimony 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of racial prejudice. These 
characterizations sought to provoke the jury to rely on racial 
stereotypes to determine that the black victim posed a threat to the 
defendant and that shooting twelve rounds at an unarmed teenager, who 
had actually tried to flee, was reasonable. It should be recognized that 
 
 378. Most state courts have rules similar to Federal Rule 403. See CLIFFORD S. 
FISHMAN, 2 JONES ON EVIDENCE §§ 11:10–11 (7th ed. Supp. 2016). Some states have a 
less stringent version of Rule 403 which more readily precludes prejudicial evidence. 
See, e.g., PA. R. EVID. 403 (which differs from the federal rule as prejudice need only 
outweigh probative value and not “substantially” outweigh probative value as required 
by the federal rule).  
 379. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 380. Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2304–05. 
 381. Darren Wilson’s grand jury consisted of six white men, three white 
women, two black women, and one black man. See Associated Press, Racial and 
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Rule 403 and its state equivalents preclude such racial prejudice and 
efforts of a party to incite racial prejudice. 
4. INADMISSIBLE EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the testimony of expert 
witnesses. It provides that a witness “who is qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise if:”382 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is 
based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the 
product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert 
has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of 
the case.383 
An example of expert witness testimony on racial character 
evidence can be found in Saldano v. Texas384 and Buck v. Davis,385 
where psychologist Dr. Walter Quijano testified that blacks and 
Hispanics had a greater propensity for violence than other races.386 In 
these cases, defense counsel failed to properly object to the testimony 
or expert reports which contained similar statements.387 In Buck, Dr. 
Quijano actually served as a witness for the defense.388 
Dr. Quijano’s conclusion that blacks and Hispanics are prone to 
violence was built on racist supposition and unreliable methodology. In 
fact, Justice Alito described Dr. Quijano’s testimony as “bizarre and 
objectionable.”389 Dr. Quijano based his conclusion on the fact that 
blacks and Hispanics are disproportionately incarcerated in comparison 
to the general population.390 While it is true that blacks and Latinos are 
 
 382. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 383. Id. 
 384. 530 U.S. 1212 (2000). 
 385. 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017).  
 386. See id. at 768; Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 884–85 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2002).  
 387. See, e.g., Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 884–85 (where Dr. Quijano testified that 
the defendant’s Hispanic heritage weighed in favor of a finding of future 
dangerousness). 
 388. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 768–69. 
 389. See Buck v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 1022, 1022 (2011). 
 390. Chebium, supra note 299.  
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overrepresented in prisons,391 this is the result of racial profiling, 
racially disproportionate stops and frisks,392 less favorable plea 
bargains,393 as well as disproportionate convictions and sentencing394—
not increased criminality.395 Such racial character evidence should be 
objected to on Rule 702(b) grounds because it is not a product of 
reliable principles and methods. 
5. INADMISSIBLE LAY OPINION TESTIMONY 
Federal Rule of Evidence 701 allows lay opinions, providing in 
relevant part that: 
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the 
form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally 
based on the witness’s perception; [and] (b) helpful to clearly 
understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact 
in issue[.]396 
Testimony that a racialized group has a particular character trait is not 
rationally based on the witness’s perception. Racism is never 
 
 391. According to 2010 statistics, 62% of the national prison population is 
black and 27% are Latino, while whites make up only 10.7%. See Prison Policy 
Initiative, United States Incarceration Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 2010 (2010), 
[https://perma.cc/29SE-7X7Q]. 
 392. See Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling of African-American Males: 
Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional Protection, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
439, 456 (2004); Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. C.L. UNION, [https://perma.cc/M7UM-
HE8N]; Vikram Dodd, Police Up to 28 Times More Likely to Stop and Search Black 
People—Study, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2012, 7:37 PM EDT), [https://perma.cc/3ETJ-
43PB] (reporting that police are “up to 28 times more likely to use stop-and-search 
powers” against blacks than whites). 
 393. Once arrested, whites are more likely to receive offers of favorable plea 
bargains. See Carodine, supra note 102, at 561–62. 
 394. Federal sentences imposed on black males are almost 20% longer than 
those imposed on whites for similar offenses. ACLU, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN 
SENTENCING 1 (2014), [https://perma.cc/92AU-RL36]. Further, blacks account for 
over 40% of current death row inmates despite only making up 13.3% of the U.S. 
population. AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: DEATH BY DISCRIMINATION 1 
(2003), [https://perma.cc/PX8Q-PLQY]; Quick Facts: United States, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, [https://perma.cc/84DG-A2HQ].  
 395. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 131 (2010) (discussing the disproportionate number of arrests 
and conviction of blacks and Latinos even though whites committed equal levels of drug 
offenses). 
 396. FED. R. EVID. 701. 
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reasonable, and racial generalizations are never sound. It is not 
reasonable or rational to attribute certain moral and behavioral 
characteristics to a group of people simply because of the color of their 
skin or racial classification. Further, a witness’s opinion that members 
of a racial group are either peaceful or violent (or any other character 
trait that might be pertinent in a police killing prosecution) is a baseless 
opinion that cannot be helpful when determining a fact in issue or 
otherwise understanding the witness’s testimony. 
D. Rebuttal Evidence of Victims’ Good Character 
Not all forms of racial character evidence can be objected to 
directly under the rules of evidence. There are several reasons for this. 
First, some racial character evidence occurs behind closed jury room 
doors and may not be easily detected or discovered. Second, some 
racial character evidence might not explicitly violate the text of the 
evidence rules; however, it may still contravene the important 
principles and values behind the rules. This is cause for concern 
because the aims of our evidence laws are not being fulfilled. Further, 
as discussed above, reliance on this racial character evidence against 
victims of color to support an acquittal may actually infringe on the 
victim’s equal protection rights.397 To remediate these contraventions of 
evidence law objectives and equal protection rights, this sub-Part 
advocates for more liberal admission of evidence that supports police 
killing victims’ good character. 
Due to the invidious nature of racism generally, and race as 
character evidence specifically, racial character evidence is rarely 
formally introduced. Thus, while it plays an outcome determinative role 
at trial, it often cannot be directly objected to at trial. This is 
particularly true for the inherent reliance type of racial character 
evidence, as well as when jurors play pseudo lay or expert opinion 
witnesses. In these circumstances, while evidence rules themselves have 
not been overtly violated, the principles, rationales, and values behind 
the rules have been violated. 
Two examples of when racial character evidence violates the 
principles behind the evidence rules rather than the enumerated rules 
themselves are when a juror offers expert or lay opinion racial 
character testimony during deliberations and when race serves to 
bolster the credibility of witnesses. To illustrate the former, we can 
look at the Peña-Rodriguez case. Juror H.C. acted as a lay opinion 
 
 397. See supra Part III. 
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witness, providing “evidence” from his personal experience that 
Mexican men have a character propensity to act with aggression, 
bravado, and entitlement against females.398 Additionally, in reliance on 
his professional experience as a former law enforcement officer, he 
acted as an expert witness for his opinion that ninety percent of the 
time, Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive towards females.399 
While jurors are supposed to use and reflect upon the common sense 
judgment of the community, here Juror H.C. acted as a witness in the 
case and effectively testified about Mexicans’ or Mexican Americans’ 
propensity to commit violence against women as proof of the 
defendant’s guilt. 
For the reasons provided above, such expert and lay opinion 
testimony on a victim’s racial character violates Federal Rules of 
Evidence 701 and 702, respectively.400 It also violates Federal Rules of 
Evidence 401 and 403 for not being relevant and for being unfairly 
prejudicial,401 both because it relies on racial prejudice and, as noted 
below, it risks overreliance by fellow jurors. Further, Rule 606(a) 
provides that “[a] juror may not testify as a witness before the other 
jurors at the trial.”402 Since this expert and lay opinion racial character 
evidence was conveyed in the jury room and not the courtroom, it does 
not directly violate the rule. However, it violates the principles, values, 
and concerns behind the rule. A sitting juror is disqualified as a witness 
under Rule 606(a) for two reasons. 
First, testifying would cast a juror in a conflicted role, for the 
juror would be asked in the end to weigh his or her own evidence 
against the evidence of other witnesses. Second, testimony by a sitting 
juror would inject serious risks of “unfair prejudice” within the 
meaning of Rule 403: The jury as a whole is likely to misuse such 
evidence, according it more or less than its due because of its close 
source.403 
In the Peña-Rodriguez case, Juror H.C. was placed (or more 
accurately, placed himself) in this conflicted role. He seemed to have 
decided that the evidence in the case was outweighed by his own 
“evidence.” Furthermore, Juror H.C. not only relied upon this racially 
biased character evidence in determining his vote on the defendant’s 
 
 398. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017). 
 399. Id. 
 400. See supra Part IV.C.4, 5. 
 401. See supra Part IV.C.2, 3. 
 402. FED. R. EVID. 606(a). 
 403. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
§ 6:15 (4th ed. 2013). 
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guilt, but he also tried to persuade other jurors with his purported 
expertise on and observations of people of Mexican descent or origin to 
convict the defendant.404 There was a serious risk of unfair prejudice 
within the meaning of Rule 403 since fellow jurors were likely to rely 
more heavily on this evidence coming from such a familiar source and 
accordingly misuse it. While a juror’s own submission of racial 
character evidence might not have violated the letter of Rule 606(a), it 
certainly violates its spirit and the rationale behind the rule. 
A second example is witness credibility. Racial character evidence 
is not always about a negative character trait; it can also be used to 
assert positive character traits. Due to implicit racial bias, whites who 
testify at trial are generally perceived to be more credible than people 
of color.405 Jurors often: 
 
[C]onsider a witness’s whiteness as de facto evidence of the 
witness’s character for truthfulness. . . . [W]ithout formally 
entering evidence or investing resources, the party calling the 
white witness has been able to bolster their witness’s 
credibility for truthfulness. Conversely, a witness of color is 
automatically considered less credible, and to bolster the 
witness of color’s character of truthfulness the party must 
navigate rigorous evidence rules.406 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 608 provides that evidence of a witness’s 
truthful character is admissible only after that witness’s character for 
truthfulness has been attacked.407 The benefits of racial character 
evidence for racially-privileged persons, particularly police officer 
defendants, are twofold. Firstly, white (or non-black) witnesses have 
bolstered credibility at the onset of their testimony, while witnesses of 
color are unable to bolster their credibility unless and until their 
character is formally attacked. Secondly, since racial character evidence 
falls below most attorneys’ and judges’ radar, it can be relied upon to 
circumvent Rule 608. The proponent of racial character evidence may 
stealthily attack a witness of color’s character—through reliance on 
blackness or brownness as a proxy for dishonesty, lack of credibility, 
 
 404. See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 870 (2017). 
 405. See generally Amanda Carlin, The Courtroom as White Space: Racial 
Performance as Noncredibility, 63 UCLA L. REV. 450, 471, 477–84 (2016); Sheri 
Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 261 (1996). 
 406. Gonzales Rose, supra note 2, at 2259. 
 407. FED. R. EVID. 608(a).  
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or otherwise bad character—without objection or recognition by the 
court that the witness’s character has been attacked. Thus, there will be 
no opportunity for rehabilitation of the witness. In other words, since it 
is not acknowledged that the witness of color’s character for 
truthfulness was attacked, a character witness cannot be called to 
bolster his or her credibility. Further, even if a witness of color’s 
character is formally attacked, he or she can only have his or her 
character bolstered by an investment of time and resources to secure 
and introduce a character witness. 
Both of these examples show how race can serve as character 
evidence allowing racism to permeate the jury box in violation of 
evidence law principles with limited, if any, opportunity for objection. 
These are examples of how the evidentiary playing field is not level in 
terms of race. This is particularly concerning in the prosecution of 
white or non-black police officers for killing people of color, where it 
is likely witnesses for the prosecution will be racial minorities. In many 
instances, racial bias played a role in the victim of color being killed by 
police on the street. Racial bias then plays a role at trial in ensuring that 
the officer is not held accountable for the killing. 
In a criminal justice system where white or otherwise racially-
privileged defendant police officers receive evidentiary benefit and 
where victims of color are collectively subordinated under the 
application or inapplicability of evidentiary rules on the basis of race, 
solutions should be crafted to create a more even evidentiary playing 
field. This is particularly necessary when racial bias might deprive a 
victim of the guarantees of equal protection. 
One solution would be for judges, in their discretion, to more 
liberally permit victim character evidence on positive traits in order to 
counter the racialized dehumanization of a victim of color at trial when 
it appears there is a risk that the jurors will rely upon racial character 
evidence in rendering a verdict. The victim’s character evidence should 
not be limited to the form of opinion or reputation testimony. Rather, 
judges should permit the prosecution leniency to present a more well-
rounded representation of the victim’s character when the defense 
paints a one-dimensional caricature of the victim based on racial 
stereotypes. Judges should also permit the prosecution to demonstrate 
the victim’s character for peacefulness not only when the victim is 
labelled aggressive or violent outright, but also when the victim’s 
character has been impeached insidiously and implicitly through the use 
of racial character evidence. A similar remedy could also be 
implemented when a witness’s character for truthfulness is impeached 
through racial character evidence. 
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One concern about allowing the introduction of evidence of a 
witness’s good character is that the jury might become too sympathetic 
about the death of the victim and convict the defendant even if the 
prosecution has not proven their case beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
is a legitimate concern in most criminal cases. Often the proverbial 
deck is stacked against a criminal defendant, despite the formal 
presumption of “innocent until proven guilty”; however, in the case of 
police officers who kill people, particularly people of color, the deck is 
stacked in favor of the officer. As set forth at the beginning of the 
Article,408 there is a reluctance at every stage of criminal proceedings to 
hold law enforcement officers accountable for killing black and brown 
persons—from prosecutors’ unwillingness to investigate and pursue 
charges, grand juries’ failure to indict, juries’ hesitance to convict, and 
judges’ light sentencing. Judges need to be aware of the reality and role 
of racial character evidence in the courtroom and make admissibility 
decisions that enhance racial equality at trial. 
E. Jury Instructions 
At the beginning of trial, jurors should be given instructions about 
what racial character evidence is, the fact that it is impermissible, and 
why. Many jurisdictions already have model jury instructions directing 
jurors to determine facts without prejudice or bias.409 For instance, 
Colorado’s Model Criminal Jury Instructions direct that jurors “must 
not be influenced by sympathy, bias or prejudice in reaching [their] 
decision.”410 Some states specifically instruct jurors to not rely upon 
racial, ethnic, or gender bias in considering the evidence.411 Several 
judges and jurisdictions go further and provide instructions on implicit 
bias.412 
Most famously, U.S. District Court Judge Mark W. Bennett413 
gives the following instruction before opening statements in all criminal 
and civil trials over which he presides: 
 
 408. See supra Part I. 
 409. Lee, supra note 264, at 1597–98; see also Anna Roberts, (Re)Forming the 
Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 859–60 
(2012). 
 410. MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., COLORADO JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 2016, at E:01, 187 (2016), [https://perma.cc/M5G5-4WLG]. 
 411. Lee, supra note 264, at 1598.  
 412. Id. at 1598–99. 
 413. Mark W. Bennett is a District Judge for U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Iowa. See Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of 
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As we discussed in jury selection, growing scientific research 
indicates each one of us has “implicit biases,” or hidden 
feelings, perceptions, fears and stereotypes in our 
subconscious. These hidden thoughts often impact how we 
remember what we see and hear and how we make important 
decisions. While it is difficult to control one’s subconscious 
thoughts, being aware of these hidden biases can help 
counteract them. As a result, I ask you to recognize that all of 
us may be affected by implicit biases in the decisions that we 
make. Because you are making very important decisions in 
this case, I strongly encourage you to critically evaluate the 
evidence and resist any urge to reach a verdict influenced by 
stereotypes, generalizations, or implicit biases.414 
Jury instructions on racial character evidence would not only serve 
to educate jurors on this important issue, but it would also help them to 
understand implicit bias. Asking jurors to recognize hidden biases and 
not allow these biases to affect their decision-making is abstract and 
difficult to employ. Providing an explanation of racial character 
evidence could supply a tangible example of how racial bias is 
improperly relied upon as “proof” in a way that can unknowingly 
influence decisions. Thus, instructions containing examples of racial 
character evidence would be a concrete way to explain the existence 
and manifestation of implicit racial bias. It is easy for judges to ask 
jurors to try to be impartial when deliberating and rendering a verdict, 
but the glaring statistics on juries’ failure to convict police officers415 
demonstrate that such vague instructions likely go unheard. It is time to 
employ more tangible, concrete means to get the jury to better 
understand the full effect of racial character evidence and implicit bias 
in the courtroom. 
Jurors should be instructed to consider only the evidence formally 
presented in the case at hand. Our laws require that people be judged 
on the basis of their actions during the event in question, and not based 
on the type of person they are and certainly never on their race. Race is 
not a relevant factor to consider in determining whether a victim, 
witness, or defendant is good or bad, peaceful or violent, honest or 
dishonest, or any other character trait. Implicit bias can work both in 
 
Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed 
Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 149 
(2010). 
 414. Id. at 169 n.85. 
 415. See supra Part I.D.  
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favor of and against individuals on the basis of their skin color and 
racial classification, but no one should be given special or disfavored 
treatment because of their race—certainly never in the courtroom. 
Taking Judge Bennett’s lead, and consistent with recommendations by 
scholars,416 potential jurors could also be educated about implicit bias 
and racial character evidence during juror orientation. This would serve 
to teach everyone summoned for jury service, irrespective of whether 
they ultimately are selected to serve on a jury, how to become more 
aware of and reduce their implicit racial biases. 
CONCLUSION 
Racialized police killings are as old as policing itself and promise 
to continue. Modern law enforcement originated with the slave 
patrols,417 and, as recently as July 2017, President Donald Trump 
openly encouraged racialized police violence, voicing support for more 
brutal treatment of “thugs” by arresting officers to thunderous applause 
from an audience of law enforcement officers.418 It appears the current 
administration is not committed to lessening or even responding to the 
national crisis of police violence against people of color. In April 2018, 
when asked about the police killing of Stephon Clark—an unarmed 
black man shot eight times, primarily in the back, in his grandmother’s 
backyard in Sacramento, California419—the Trump Administration’s 
Press Secretary answered that his death was merely a “local matter.”420 
The lack of executive leadership on this urgent civil rights issue makes 
 
 416. Roberts, supra note 409, at 860–66. 
 417. See, e.g., NORM STAMPER, TO PROTECT AND SERVE: HOW TO FIX 
AMERICA’S POLICE 22 (2016); Ex-Seattle Police Chief Condemns Systemic Police 
Racism Dating Back to Slave Patrols, DEMOCRACY NOW! (July 14, 2016), 
[https://perma.cc/YB5X-R6ZA]. 
 418. Maggie Haberman & Liz Robbins, Trump, on Long Island, Vows an End 
to Gang Violence, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/us/politics/trump-immigration-gang-violence-
long-island.html.  
 419. Jelani Cobb, Stephon Clark and the Shooting of Black Men, Armed and 
Unarmed, NEW YORKER (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-
comment/stephon-clark-and-the-shooting-of-black-men-armed-and-unarmed; Frances 
Robles & Jose A. Del Real, Stephon Clark Was Shot 8 Times Primarily in His Back, 
Family-Ordered Autopsy Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/30/us/stephon-clark-independent-autopsy.html. 
 420.  Katie Reilly, Trump White House Calls Fatal Police Shooting of Stephon 
Clark a “Local Matter,” TIME (Mar. 28, 2018, 8:00 PM ET), 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20180415204825/http://time.com/5219574/donald-trump-
stephon-clark-local-matter/]. 
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it all the more imperative that we understand and address the role that 
racial character evidence plays in the unwarranted police killings of 
black and brown people on the street, and, of equal importance, the 
function it serves in exonerating police officers at trial, or in making 
sure these cases never even get there in the first place. Race is 
impermissibly used as evidence in the courtroom every day, and 
evidence law needs to be employed to preclude it from further harming 
victims of color, their communities, and the actual and perceived 
legitimacy of our criminal justice system. 
 
